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Should careful and rational management of fish stocks 
be considered a myth or a realistic prospect?
Recent history has shown how. because of over-exploi-
tation of certain fish-stocks – among which herring. an-
chovy and cod are prime examples – the survival of some
species has become an acute problem. Today all fishing
zones are threatened, and no stock is safe from potential 
collapse.
The situation is so serious that some scientists and fish-
workers’ organisations have acted to sound the alarm and 
to demand from governments that measures to protect 
the resource be implemented.
However, looking beyond the indispensable need for
legislation, it is the search for maximum profit which,
unfortunately, so often governs fish production and mar-
keting that must be challenged. Moreover, the question of
resource management must integrate the need  to safe-
guard the ecology of the marine environment, which requires
profound changes of mentality.
In Lisbon, Portugal, in June 1989, about one hundred 
scientists, fishermen and organisation representatives 
from 25 different countries met at a symposium to develop
their thinking on these questions. In this dossier, we 
publish some papers by European speakers at this inter-
national meeting organised by ICSF
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Editorial
A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY
E nvironmental questions are presently an important issue in public debate around theworld, whether in East or West, North or South. In many countries, the recent elec-
toral successes of those who stand for the defence of ecology are a sure indication that the
future of the planet Earth is foremost in the minds of men and women of our generation.
Unfortunately, ecological issues are all too often limited to a consideration of the dam-
age done on land by the various sources of pollution. It is often forgotten that the oceans
are not a refuse dump but an essential element of the planet's equilibrium and survival.
To speak of the marine environment's importance for the survival of mankind is to
speak above all of the management of its resources. For our purposes, that means man-
agement of fish stocks, in particular. It is a fragile resource base and there is plenty of evi-
dence to show that, if mismanaged or over-exploited, it can easily become a non-renew-
able resource, jeopardising thereby the future livelihood of fishworkers and of their fam-
ilies, as well as that of millions of other people for whom fish is part of their staple diet.
It is therefore essential to pay the greatest possible attention to resource management
and the protection of the marine environment. With a view to increasing awareness and
proposing solutions to the urgent problems at hand, the International Collective in
Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) organised a symposium in Lisbon in June 1989. It was
attended by about one hundred people from both North and South - fishermen, organisa-
tion leaders, scientists, technicians and sympathisers - who centred their discussions on
"The marine environment and the future of  fishworkers".
Through their meeting and exchange of views, the various participants emphasized
that the quality of the environment is a major condition for the survival and development
of coastal populations. They also declared that the protection of othe ocean and of the sea-
shore must be a priority concern and the joint responsibility of fishworkers and of gov-
ernments. As for the management of the resources – which must remain a common good
- this should also be done jointly. The methods by which our heritage is managed should
become part of an overall fisheries policy encompassing social, economic and ecological
objectives.
In this dossier, we publish some of the papers presented at the symposium by scien-
tists and representatives of European fishworkers' organisations. From somewhat differ-









L es questions de l'environnement sont aujourd'hui au cœur des débats qui traversent lessociétés, tant à l'Est qu'à l'Ouest, au Nord qu'au Sud. Il n'est que de voir les succès
électoraux remportés récemment, un peu partout, par ceux qui se présentent en défenseurs
de l'écologie pour se rendre compte que l'avenir de la planète préoccupe au plus haut point
les femmes et les hommes de notre génération.
Malheureusement, trop souvent encore, la préoccupation écologique se borne à 
prendre en considération les dégâts causés sur terre par les diverses sources de pollution.
On oublie que la mer n'est pas une poubelle mais qu'elle est un élément indispensable à
l'équilibre et à la survie de la planète.
Parler d'environnement à propos des océans, dans une perspective de survie de l'human-
ité, c'est tout d'abord parler de la gestion des ressources. Et en ce qui nous concerne, de la
gestion de la ressource halieutique. Or cette ressource est fragile et force est de constater -
expériences à l'appui - que mal gérée ou sur-exploitée, elle peut facilement devenir une
richesse non renouvelable mettant ainsi en péril l'avenir des travailleurs de la pêche et de leurs
familles, ainsi que celui de millions d'autres personnes dont le poisson est l'aliment de base.
Il importe donc de considérer, avec attention, les questions de gestion des ressources
et de protection de l'environnement marin. C'est pourquoi, et afin de faire progresser la
prise de conscience et répondre à l'urgence des problèmes posés, le Collectif International
d'Appui aux Travailleurs de la Pêche (ICSF) a organisé à Lisbonne, en juin 1989, un
Symposium qui a rassemblé une centaine de personnes -pêcheurs, responsables d'organi-
sations, scientifiques, techniciens et sympathisants -originaires de 25 pays du Nord et du
Sud. Thème de la réflexion:  ”Environnement marin et avenir des travailleurs de la pêche”.
La confrontation et l'échange entre les divers participants ont souligné, avec 
force, que la qualité de l'environnement est une condition majeure de la survie et du
développement des populations côtières. La protection de la mer et du littoral est une 
priorité et relève de la responsabilité conjointe des travailleurs de la pêche et des
Gouvernements, a-t-il été affirmé. Quant à la gestion de la ressource - qui doit demeurer
propriété collective - elle doit, elle aussi, être réalisée en commun. Les méthodes de 
gestion de ce patrimoine doivent être intégrées dans une politique globale des pêches qui
tient compte d'objectifs sociaux, économiques et écologiques.
Nous publions dans ce dossier quelques interventions descientifiques et de 
responsables d'organisations de pêcheurs de pays européens exprimées au Symposium.
Ces contributions mettent l'accent, avec des nuances quelque peu différentes, sur la




A matter of human survival
MASTERING 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In the following article, Gunnar Saetersdal, one of the main
authorities on the question of resource management and honorary
director of the Institute for Oceanographic Research of Bergen
(Norway), takes us on a voyage through the history of world 
fishe-ries. On the way he describes the many hurdles faced by 
scientists and fishermen in their effort to make use of an important
source of human nourishment in a rational manner: fish.
The article (1) contains the main part of the treatise presented by
Gunnar Saetersdal in course of the Symposium on Marine 
Environment and the Future of Fishworkers.
I n our efforts to use the living resources of the sea to provide food for us, whichfishing is mainly about, we encounter various types of problems.
One very basic difficulty which underlines all of man’s use of living 
rene-wable resources is to ensure that in their use, we still preserve them as 
lasting resources for an indefinite future. This must be accomplished through
proper management of the fisheries, and since the fish stocks are remote and the
sea inaccessible and vast the art of biological fishery management is complex
and has been developed only fairly recently.
A second important set of problems is related to the simple question : who
owns the fish in the sea? After it has been caught it usually belongs to the 
fisherman or the vessel owner, but for the resources existing in the sea there
are problems of deciding on who should be given access to them and how this
access should be allocated. These problems exist on a global level, between
economic classes of nations, between neighbouring states, between types of
fisheries e.g. industrial versus small scale and even at the level of single 
fishermen. It is not possible in this brief review to deal exhaustively with these
problems of allocation of the fisheries wealth of the sea, but I will try to look at
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larger scale implications of the Law of the Sea (LOS) régime after its 
introduction about ten years ago.
Finally there is a set of problems related to which usage is being made of
the fish that is taken from the sea. The availability of food is insufficient for many
groups of people in the world today and the future food situation globally is 
uncertain. Fish is first and foremost food and we should ask how our usage of it
could in the best possible way contribute to alleviate problems of nutrition, now
and in the future.
When industrial fisheries migrate towards the South
Most of the statistical information for this section derive from FAOs 
Year-books of Fishery Statistics.
Starting with the history of world fisheries we should note that while artisanal
coastal fisheries have existed since prehistoric times, industrial fisheries on a
large scale are a recent almost post-war phenomenon. The growth of the global
fish production from about 20 million tons in 1950 to 80 million tons in 1986 (91
million with inland fisheries included) is shown in the figure.(Figure 1) Presented
on a logarithmic scale we see some clear trends. The two first decades 1950s,
and 1960s of very rapid growth can be ascribed to the effects of introduction of
new fishing technologies, synthetic fibres for the gears, stern trawling, ring netting
and tuna long lining combined with a spread of industrial fisheries from nuclei in
the North Atlantic and North Pacific to lower latitudes. This process included the
creation of distant water fleets by high technology fishing nations, notably Japan,
USSR, other East European nations, Spain and Korea which for their production
depended on resources outside the home waters of these countries.
4
Figure 1. World fish landing, 1948-1986.
While thus in the early period by far the major part of the world catch came
from the Northern parts of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the 1960s there was
an expansion Southwards. An example is the Eastern Pacific where, following the
collapse of the Californian sardine stock in the 1950s, fish meal plants and fleets
were moved Southwards to Peru and created the start of the great fishery which
developed on the anchoveta stock of that country.
And as other resources in the Northern areas became fully utilised the
expanding fishing industries of many nations moved on to other regions, notably
the high productive coastal areas at lower latitudes such as the shelves off the
Southwest and Northwest Africa. And increasing demands for tuna and shrimp
created global fisheries for these high-valued resources.
Around 1970 a number of large pelagic stocks, among them the Peruvian
anchovy, collapsed and the trend of the slower growth of the world catch during
the 1970s is at least to some extent the result of such resource failures. The
resumed higher rate of growth in recent years results partly from resource 
variability from natural causes, partly from a better use of known resources, 
perhaps as a consequence of improved conditions for management under the LOS
regime. It is, however, unlikely that this recent high rate of growth of world fisheries
will continue for yery long. I will return later to the question of the total potential of
the world fish resources, but we can already now state that further substantial
growth of world catch will be restricted by resource limitations. In most of the worlds
important fishing areas we are approaching a full utilization of the fish stocks.
It is of interest to consider briefly the geographical distribution on a global
scale of the fish resources and the fisheries. As all fishermen know there are parts
of the sea where fish are plentiful and other parts where you will never make a
catch. On a larger scale the distribution and abundance of fish is closely related
to the level of primary production, the production of plants in the sea. The basic
requirement for plant growth is as on land light and nutrient salts, and areas of
high production in the sea are found where water with high nutrient content is
brought up to the surface layers. At higher latitudes by convection caused by 
winter cooling, at lower latitudes by upwelling of subsurface water caused by 
prevailing wind and current Systems and partly by river discharges.
The rate of plant production in the various parts of the oceans can be 
measured. A yery significant feature of these measurements indicate the generai
low productivity found in the open seas, large parts of them are nearly a kind of
ocean deserts. Most areas of high productivity are found over the continental
shelves, but there are large variations also within the shelf regions. True tropical
areas with nice blue warm water are in generai low-productive.
The high productivity of the northern parts of the oceans is evident, and we
can see from the table of the distribution of the world catch (Figure 2) that these
areas prqvide the highest contributions of the catch. The central regions corne
next while fish production in the Southern part of the globe is low, especially in the
vast Southern Ocean, mainly because few fish stocks have been able to inhabit
this region where the continental shelf area is so limited.
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The enrichments of the surface waters by the upwelling process is a 
remarkable phenomenon, which is the basis of existence for some of the worlds
largest and most well known fish stocks such as the Peruvian anchoveta and the
Californian, Morroccan and Namibian Sardines as well as the other associated
resources in these regions. (Figure 3) Roughly 20 million tons of the world catch
of 80 million cornes from the Eastern margin upwelling systems which are 
associated with the tradewinds, the Peru, Californian, Canary and Benguella
Current systems. As most of these border developing fishing nations it is perhaps
more significant to note that these 20 million tons represent about half of the total
global catch landed in developing countries.
A relatively small number of countries stand out as the dominating fishing
naons of the world.(Figure 4) Japan and the USSR top the list with the great
home waters as well as global fisheries. China is known for its highly 
developed inland fisheries and aquaculture production and Chile and Peru for their 
6
Figure 2. WORLD MARINE FISH CATCH 1986 
BY MAJOR FISHING AREAS.
ATLANTIC OCEAN 24.3 MILL TONNES
PACIFIC OCEAN 51.0 MILL TONNES
INDIAN OCEAN 4.5 MILL TONNES
SOUTHERN OCEAN 0.5 MILL TONNES
NORTHERN REGIONS 42.5 MILL TONNES
CENTRAL REGIONS 20.9 MILL TONNES
SOUTHERN REGIONS 17.0 MILL TONNES
Fig. 3. Distribution of phosphatic deposits.  Adapted from Tooms (1967).
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Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
China  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Peru  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chile  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indonesia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phillipines  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Denmark  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
North Korea  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iceland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Canada  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mexico  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Taiwan  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ecuador  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . .
France  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brazil  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
S.Africa &
Namibia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Viet Nam  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bangladesh  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Poland  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burma  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malaysia  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Turkey  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Italy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Netherlands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Argentina  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Portugal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Faroe Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Zealand  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ghana  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Venezuela  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Romania  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Senegal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cuba  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

















































large fisheries of small pelagics. Ten countries have total catches exceeding 2
million tons and they account for some 56 million of the 91 million global catch.
There are as we see a number of developing nations among the top fishing 
countries, they are in fact in majority. I will later examine more closely the 
North - South relation in world fishing.
The composition by major groups of fish of the world catch is shown in this
table (Figure 5). The pelagic schooling fish dominate and represent as a whole
nearly half the catch by weight. Except for tuna they are mostly of lower market
value than the demersal fish, but for this reason they are in many areas important
as cheap and nutritious food.
Of special interest are the nearly 2 million tons of shrimps and prawns which
are of high market value and mostly caught at lower latitudes (Figure 6). Also tuna
and important parts of the cephalopods belong in the central parts of the oceans
and represent resources with a high availability for developing nations, but these
are to a larger extent than the shrimps exploited by the distant water fleets from
industrial fishing nations.
A scientific base : the main priority now!
In its broad sense fishery management may serve a variety of purposes and
have objectives of economic and social nature within the fisheries sector, but its
most fundamental objectives follows from the fact that fisheries represent a 
utilization of biological renewable resources which must be preserved for 
indefinite use. This basic biological objective is often defined as highest 
sustainable physical yield , but it is at times modified e.g. highest economic value
or highest profit. Taking account of special aims of the community in protecting
certain groups of fishermen other levels of yield can be specified as long as
resource conservation is ensured by not exceeding the limits set by the potential
of stock. In the history of fisheries there are unfortunately many examples of
excess of exploitation which has caused depletion of resources.
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Figure 5. MAJOR GROUPS OF FISH IN WORLD CATCH, MILL. TONNES
HERRINGS, SARDINES, ANCHOVIES 23.9
CODS, HAKES etc. 13.5
HORSE MACKERELS, JACKS, SAURIES 7.2
REDFISHES, BASSES, CONGERS 6.0
MACKERELS, SNOEKS, HAIRTAILS 4.0
TUNAS, BONITOS, BILLFISHES 3.4
SHRIMPS, PRAWNS 1.9
SQUIDS, CUTTLEFISH, OCTOPUSES 1.7
FLOUNDERS, HALIBUTS 1.3
SALMON, TROUTS, SMELTS 1.0
SHARKS, RAYS 0.6
If we go back in time, and in some areas we need not go back very many
decades we can see that as fisheries developed beyond the small scale the need
for a scientific basis for the exploitation of fish stocks became urgent.
As an introduction to the subject, both technically and historically it may be 
useful to reyiew briefly the development of this fishery science in the Northeast
Atlantic, an area of both ancient fisheries and of early development of science.
Historically both fisheries technology and principles for biological management have
spread from this area to other parts of the world. The long time series of data we
have from this region also makes it of special interest for studies. These series are
due to the formation by the scientists of the region of an international body for 
cooperation, ICES (2) already at the start of this century and through its published
records we can follow the events both in the fisheries and in the science.
The landings of this region (Figure 7) show an increase from about 2 million
tons in 1910 to 10-12 million in recent years. This growth resulted mainly from a
process of taking into exploitation an increasing number of fish stocks up to about
1970. Since then one can say that all stocks are fully utilized and some 
overexploited.
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Figure 6. DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD SHRIMP FISHERIES AT LOW
LATITUDES BY MAIN REGIONS AND FISHING COUNTRIES,
1986.




ATLANTIC 202 USA, MEXICO
51 WESTERN 
INDIAN 
OCEAN 238 PERSIAN GULF STATES, INDIA
71 WESTERN 
CENTRAL










But already at the start of this period, at the beginning of the century there
was concern for some of the stocks. For some fisheries this concern was caused
by great fluctuations in the yield between periods of years, and in the poor years
the coastal fishermen suffered seriously. And in the rapidly developing trawl 
fisheries of the North Sea the often large by-catches of undersized juvenile fish
gave cause for concern for the stocks. Would this cause depletion of the
resources in the long run?
The period of the war years 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 provided the 
scientists with some important information of the effects of the fisheries on 
exploited stocks. We see from the landing records that the catches dropped
markedly in these periods, an effect of reduced effort of fishing caused by the war.
This reduced effort caused however also changes in the fishstocks themselves.
Both their density as well as the proportion of large sized fish increased as shown
by the records of catch per days absence of trawlers and the proportion of size
categories in the catch from the North Sea before and after the first world war.
Another important finding from these early years was made through a
technique which enabled the aging of fish. It was then discovered that there is
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Figure 7.
Fish landings in the Northeast Atalntic, 1910-1985
often a variation, some times very great in the results of the annual reproduction
of fish stocks, and this was shown to be the main the underlying cause of good
and bad years experienced by the fishermen.
These discoveries led the scientists onto a path of considering the fish stocks
as populations, like human populations, whose reproduction, growth and mortality
could be measured and analysed. Through this approach the fate of the stocks
under various conditions of nature and different forms and levels of exploitation
could be assessed and even predicted. By about 1950 great advances had been
made in the creation of this special science dealing with the exploitation of fish
resources. But the political international instrument for making use of the advice
from the scientists lagged behind. It was also in this early period that one of the
pioneers of fishery science, Michael Graham of Lowestoft in England, formulated
his "Great Law of Fishing" which says that unlimited fisheries become unprofitable.
"Because of increased fishing effort resulting from improved efficiency and
addition of capital, industrial fisheries will, if left to themselves move in a self
defeating process towards a marginal state". This represents a version of the
Tragedy of the Commons (3) and is still of considerable actuality.
Eventually a convention for the regulation of fisheries was agreed by the European
fishing nations, a fishery commission was established and from the mid 1950s on 
various measures to safeguard stocks and ensure lasting yields were introduced in the
fisheries. This commission regime lasted about 20 years until it was replaced by the
present LOS regime, but its history was not to be a happy period for Northeast Atlantic
fisheries. In spite of the efforts by the scientists and the Commission the period ended
with most of the main resources in a state of overexploitation and for some even 
depletion. Although this is now history and we have left this regime of open access
behind us it may still be of interest to examine the causes of failures during that time.
First we should note that this was a period of very great advances in fishing
technology. One of the results was the creation of an entirely new type of fisheries:
open sea ring netting for pelagic schooling fish, herring and mac-kerel. These
stocks had previously been exploited mostly in the coastal areas and with far less
efficient gears. The new and expanding fisheries created problems for the 
scientists. Their experience had mainly been built on trawl fisheries, and while the
mean catch per hours trawling is a fair measure of the abundance of a stock, the
mean catch per set of a ring net is of little or no value for estimating stock 
abundance. New methods had to be developed for the pelagic stocks and looking
at this first period as a race between technology and science one can say that in
the first instance this was won by fishing technology. The dramatic results of this can
perhaps best be demonstrated by reviewing the fate of the Norwegian Spring
Spawning stock of herring. This stock was reduced from a 10 million tonne biomass
in the 1950s to virtually zero in 1970. The advice submitted in 1965 when the stock
had all but collapsed was that the exploitation is still at a level where no benefit for
total landings can be expected from any regulatory measure. No restrictions on 
fishing was advised until 1970 and the collapse of the stock only came to be fully
recognized over the years 1970 - 1975 with a total ban on fishing advised in 1975.
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Only towards the end of the 1960s did the scientists develop the capability to
diagnose the state of these types of pelagic stocks and submit appropriate advice.
It was by then too late to save the Norwegian herring, but another great herring
stock, that of the North Sea on which the new fishing started somewhat later had
not entirely collapsed by 1970. But in spite of a series of timely and appropriate
recommendations from the scientists from 1970 onwards the Commission was not
able to obtain agreements among its members to reduce the excessive rate of
exploitation on this stock and also this herring was slowly depleted.
This failure of international management by NEAFC (4) and other similar bodies
under the open access conditions was not caused by faulty procedures or an 
inadequate convention. The solution of the problem was not on the technical, but on
the moral plane. The parties concerned were unable to act in unison for a common
benefit against short term individual interests. This impasse is an example of "the
tragedy of the commons", a state which covers a number of fundamental issues
becoming of increasing importance in man's usage of the global commons of the 
biosphere and which eventually perhaps will be decisive for our survival on this planet.
In our fisheries world the many failures of management under the open
access, "commons" regime represented an important argument in favour of the
extension of coastal state jurisdiction in the preparations for the new Law of the
Sea Convention. And with this we enter the present LOS regime which with its
Exclusive Economic Fishing Zones has been the framework for fisheries 
management since about 1977. The LOS Convention dates from 1982, but
most coastal states extended their fisheries jurisdiction through national 
legislation in the late 1970s on the basis of an agreed draft text of the
Convention. Under this new regime the responsibility for management with 
reference to certain standards is in principle shifted onto the coastal states.
In the Northeast Atlantic a major part of the management problems are, 
however, still of an international nature because the distribution of a majority of the
stocks, representing some 80 per cent of the resources covers more than one
economie zone. The limits of the EEZs in many cases split the sea areas and thus
the stocks belonging there. Similar conditions are found in many parts of the world
including developing regions. In this sense open access still remains and there is
a need to reach agreement on objectives and standards of management and to
adjust national fisheries policies to international fisheries. And new problems are
created of allocation of the shared resources among the parties concerned.
As expected the new regime brought about considerable improvements in
the conditions for management, the main reason being that the responsibility for
management is now clearly placed on the coastal state and much fewer parties
are now involved where international agreements are needed for shared stocks.
In the Northeast Atlantic this has led to improved states for some stocks, 
especially the pelagic fish. For most demersal stocks there is not much change,
perhaps mainly because of excessive fleet capacity.
There are, however, some recent developments in science which may lead
us towards new approaches to management.The stocks have under the
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present system largely been regulated individually as if they existed as 
independent resource units although there has been an awareness of 
phenomena of interdependence for quite some time.
Research has, in important cases, demonstrated the nature of such 
interdependence with processes of predation or competition. Uncertainties and
disagreements still remain of the quantitative aspects, but the consequences
appear to be so important that they have to be considered even under some
uncertainty. Some account is being taken in single stock assessments of known
interrelationships, but the more spectacular implication is possible future 
manipulations of the whole System through long term management.
There could for instance be a choice between maximizing either the 
quantity or the value of the total yields. Very simplified one could say that the 
highest yield in tonnage would be obtained through a policy of high fishing 
pressure on predator stocks and allowing prey stocks such as herring, mackerel
and capeline to expand, while a limitation of the biomass of the plankton-eaters,
mackerel, herring and others may resuit in increased levels of recruitment for high
valued demersal fish and hence a maximization of the value of the total yield.
This review of nearly a century's development of fishery research and 
management in the Northeast Atlantic can be concluded on this note: one can
look back on great progress and many important achievements and the existence
of the resources are in general safeguarded, but the System is still imperfect. The
most important challenges relate to the still existing and apparently great 
potentials for economic gains of further improvements.
With this history and present state of the art the Northeast Atlantic must be
classed as one of the world centres of fishery research and management, a condition
explained by the many highly developed fishing nations here and what must surely be
the worlds highest concentration of fishery research institutions. This state of fishery
research and management is at least for the recent period fairly representative of ail
fishing regions adjacent to the industrial nations. But there are important resources
and fisheries also in the seas off the less developed nations.
What are the extent and nature of management problems in these fisheries
and how have the countries been able to deal with that responsibility in terms of 
scientific advice and management Systems? To give a comprehensive answer to
this question would take us beyond the limits of this lecture as the fisheries of the
developing world are numerous and highly versatile. But we can, I think, assume
that biological management needs would be most important where fisheries are
industrialized and concentrated. This is the case in the upwelling regions and I will
attempt to give some very brief insights into the situations in the Peru Current 
system in the Pacific and the Canary and Benguela current Systems in the Atlantic.
Prior to the 1950s the high production of the Peru Current System was
exploited by man nearly only through harvesting of the guano from the 20 
million plus birds of the area. The Peruvian Guano Company tried hard to prevent
the growth of the anchoveta fishery and internationally renown ornithologists 
issued predictions of disasters for the birds. Events certainly proved 
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them right, the fishery eventually reduced the birds to roughly 1 /10 of their
previous abundance.(Figure 8) But this could of course not stop the growth of
the industry which as we see increased at a rate of nearly a million tonne per
year during the 1960s and brought the fishery to the top of the world scale by
early 1970 with a total yield of about 12 million tons. Fisheries thus where an
industry on which Peru became highly dependent, a situation which soon
proved to be precarious. In 1972, after about five years of annual catches of
10 million tons or more, the Peru current upwelling system was seriously 
disturbed by an environmental disruption caused by the El Niño phenomenon,
a climatic short term change which with intervais of 5 - 10 years affects 
smaller or larger parts of the Eastern Pacific. One of the effects is a reduction
and redistribution of the upwelling process and thereby the productivity of the
system. Its occurrence prior to the history of the fishery can be traced through
variation in the guano production.
The 1972 El Niño was followed by a collapse of the anchovy stock and the
fishery, and subsequently by the arguments between the two schools which
usually develop to explain the causes of such collapses, whether they are 
fishery induced or caused by nature. In this case it seems a compromise was
14
Catch of small pelagic f ish in the Peru Current System 1956-1986 and El Niño 
years.
Figure 8.
reached fairly soon. The fishery had not been allowed to develop entirely
freely, there was concern for the maintenance of the resource and some 
regulations had been introduced to restrict the fishing effort. But even in this
huge fishery a very large overcapacity of fleets and processing capacity had
been allowed to develop during the boom years and regulations took the form
of catch quotas and closed season resulting in competition and high fishing
pressure also on juvenile fish. With fishing continuing well into 1972 and 
failing reproduction caused by the El Niño the collapse is fully explained. There
was some recoyery of the stock after 1972, but the pressure to keep the huge
industry which was nationalised after the collapse alive was enormous and the
rate of exploitation on the recovering stock was high. With a new although
more moderate El Nino in 1976 the anchoveta was further depleted.
The great reduction of the major component of the System, the anchoveta,
allowed the other pelagic species belonging there: sardine, horse mackerel and
mackerel to expand and in the 1970s a fishery on these stocks was started with 
refitted fleets. The species change was accompanied by a South-ward shift of the 
distribution of the resources causing the Chilean part of the catch to increase greatly.
But there were more environmental distribution in store, the strongest El
Niño in this century with effects over the whole Eastern Pacific and even wider
occurred in 1982-83 and caused a further decline of the anchoveta. The other
stocks seem less susceptible to the environmental effects and fishing could 
continue on these. This perhaps saved the anchoveta which recovered markedly in
1985-86, but with some setback in 1987 following a moderate El Niño in that year.
This brief account of the events in the Peru Current system demonstrate the
challenges to the managers of these fisheries. The dimensions and nature of the
stock changes and of the environmental disruption have attracted great 
international interest and there has been a considerable foreign scientific input to
the region in addition to multilateral efforts for research developments. The
national research institutions on which the managers must rely for advice 
struggle, however, with inadequate logistic support for their important tasks.
The fisheries off the Northwest African Coast indicate that more stable and less
dramatic stock situations prevail in the region of the Canary Current upwelling system.
(Figure 9). The total landings shown in the diagram refer to the Eastern Central Atlantic
area which also covers the Gulf of Guinea, but by far the major part of the catch cornes
from the high productive shelf area from Morocco to Liberia. By the mid 1970s the total
catch approached 4 million tons as a resuit of increased fishing from foreign long 
distance fleets, but the extension of coastal state jurisdiction cause some reduction of
foreign access, and catches declined particularly of the small pelagics. There is no
record of stock collapses from this region, but variability has been observed particularly
in the largest resource, the Moroccan sardine. When comparing this situation with the
collapse of similar sardine stocks in the Benguela and California Current systems and
with the drastic stock changes in Peru and Chile the higher stability off Northwest Africa
can perhaps be ascribed to a more moderate fishing pressure here.
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Resources research and fishery development in this region has been 
promoted and supported by an FAO regional commission, but activities at the
national level are inadequate in most of the coastal countries. The main problems
of management which have been confronted up till now are those related to the
access of fleets from non-coastal nations. The share of these fleets of the total
catch has declined under the new regime, but is still between 45 and 50 per cent.
The jurisdiction over an important part of the region, the high productive shelf off
the former Spanish Sahara remains in dispute and this adds to the problems of
control and surveillance by the coastal states.
The development of shore-based fisheries which resu|ts in a true transfer
of resource wealth to the developing countries is in progress and this process
will require much more comprehensive, reliable and timely information on the
resources than is being made available to the decision makers at present. A
number of the important stocks in the region are trans-boundary and shared
16
Eastern Central Atlantic region (Canary Current 
System). Total catch and catch of small pelagic fish.
Figure 9.
between neighbouring states, but the related complex of management pro-blems
have not yet been addressed. In total this region can be described as one in
need of major improvements in the field of fisheries research and management.
Finally, the Benguela Current upwelling system again shows us some quite
spectacular histories of fisheries and stocks (Figure 10). Politically, conditions are
special with the shelf off Namibia still under open access, the only important shelf
in the world to remain in this state. With the independence of Namibia now in
progress this condition is not likely to last for very long. The open access has 
resulted in the maintenance of an international fishery with the participation of a
number of long distance fleets in addition to the coastal states, the Republic of
South Africa and Angola, and a management System of the "commission type" of
the old fishery regime. In addition to reviewing the state of research and 
management in this region it is of interest to assess the performance of this 
otherwise obsolete management System in a world of extended fisheries jurisdiction.
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The commission is ICSEAF, the International Commission for the South East
Atlantic Fisheries, created in the early 1970s. It fonctions as an advisory body
submitting management recommendations including catch quotas, while alloca-
tion of quotas and other action is decided by the contracting parties outside the
Commissions framework. The main focus has been on the stocks and fisheries of
the Namibian shelf where there is no national effort in research or management.
The total catches in the Southeast Atlantic declined from a level of 3 
million tons in the late 1960s and early 1970s to about 2 million tons in the later
years. There was a rapid decline and finally a collapse of the Namibian sardine
stock, from a bio-mass level of 6 million tons in the 1960s to about 100.000 tons
over the last ten years. The large and valuable hake stocks were also greatly
reduced in the 1970s by a combination of excessive fishing and too small trawl
mesh sizes. Some recoyery resulted from good recruitment in the early 1980s,
but their state of overfishing continue with an unfavorable fishing pattern and
too high fishing mortality. The horse mackerel increased towards 1980 possibly
an ecological effect of the depletion of the sardine, but has declined in the later
years probably as a resuit of the fishery.
The resource information provided by ICSEAF is of commendable 
cover-age and standard, but one is left with the impression that the scientific
adyice and its application is affected by the open access conditions of the 
fisheries. For demersal stocks the management performance is still perhaps not
very different from that in our own region, but there is a serious 
mismanagement of the sardine stock, where a substantial part of a 
recruitment-overfished stock is being removed by the fishery each year.
Here we have again then a major fishing region where the tasks of 
rebuilding and maintaining the fish resources are complex and demanding. For
the time being these are being dealt with, although not adequately, by a regional
commission, but the responsibility will soon fall on the coastal states Namibia and
Angola, at present fishing nations with a very limited capacity for this work.
These brief insights into some selected fishing regions of the developing part
of our world show us that the challenges and demands to fishery research and
management are not unexpectedly at least as great and complex as those we
have been confronted with in our own region. The industrial fishing nations have
played a key role in the creation of exploitation problems by fishing with long 
distance fleets and through the transfer of modem fishing technologies. There has
also been a process, but on a less impressive scale of transfer of the art of 
fishery science and management through services and advice, education and
training and support of institution building, but in general one must conclude that
the majority of developing fishing nations are in need of further support for the
development of adequate systems for fishery science, advice and management,
and for surveillance and control of their fisheries. And we should note that in this
development as well as in the functioning of the systems the representatives of
all who work in the countries fishing sector should play an important role.
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The new Law of the Sea : 
and the Southern countries ?
The extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 NM resulting from the adoption
at least in practice of the Law of the Sea Convention raised great expectations for
improved resource management and a more equitable sharing of the ocean's
wealth between developed and developing nations. As discussed under the 
section of fishery management the new regime has created better conditions for
resource conservation, and there are some examples of improved state of
resources which it may seem reasonable to ascribe to the effects of these
improvements. But to what extent has the new regime met the expectations to a
more equitable sharing in a North/South context of the worlds fish resources?
The FAO Fisheries Statistical Yearbooks give the world landings by economie
classes of countries (Figure 11). The records show that during the period 1975 - 77
to 1984 - 86, before and some time after the introduction of the EEZ regime, the total
world catch increased from about 68 million tons to about 87 million tons. The share
of the developing countries over the same period increased from about 43 to more
than 50 per cent. Part of this increased share is attributable to increased catches in
inland waters, almost all from developing countries. But even with full allowance for
this, it is clear that there has been a proportional increase in marine fish production
in developing countries. It seems reasonable to relate this at least in part to the
extension of fisheries jurisdiction. But considered on a per capita basis we see that
the share of the developing world is only 1/3 of that of the developed world.
A study of the fishing by industrialised nations off the coasts of developing
countries shows on the other hand that during the period 1977 to 1983 the 
global level of catches of these distant water fleets remained remarkably 
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Figure 11. NOMINAL WORLD CATCHES BY ECONOMIC CLASSES OF
COUNTRIES AND CATCH FROM INLAND WATERS. MILL
TONS
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stable at a figure of around 5 million tons per year. This suggests that quantitatively
there was not any major "take-over" of the resources off the coasts of the 
developing countries up till then fished by foreign fleets. Indeed the foreign fishing
effort remained at more or less the same level as under the open access regime.
Although detailed data are not available for the most recent years it is likely this 
situation still prevails. This stability is in marked contrast to the dramatic decline in
the catches by foreign fleets in the Northern fishing regions over the same period.
These dropped from about 2.2 million tons to 0.2 million in the Northwest Atlantic
and from 1.9 million to 1.3 million tons in the Northeast Pacific. The industrial 
fishing nations have thus to a large extent stopped the foreign fishing within their EEZs.
This stable long distance catch of about 5 million tons masks however 
significant variations in regional trends. In the Eastern Central Atlantic for 
example the foreign catch declined from 2.5 million tons in 1977 to 1.6 million in
1983 and since the total catch remained fairly stable at about 3.2 million tons this
demonstrates an increase in the share of the catch taken locally.
In the Southwest Atlantic foreign fishing operations increased substantially
in the period. In the Southeast Atlantic there is a slight decline of foreign catch
from a mean 1.7 million tons in 1977 to 1.3 million tons in 1983, but this is 
probably due to resource variability.
In the Western Central Pacific there has been a modest increase in the catches by
foreign countries, but this has been offset by an even higher trend of increase of total tuna
catches in the region, tuna being the main target species there in the Eastern Central
Pacific another important tuna region, foreign fishing has remained at a stable level.
But although foreign fishing has been maintained at about the same level
in developing regions some positive effects of the new regime in favour of the
developing nations can still be established. For certain countries which have
already attained a significant degree of national capacity in the fisheries 
sector and have adequate economic infrastructure to sustain development
there are examples of rapid growth of fisheries. Thus Mexico has built out the
domestic tuna fleet from 19 vessels in 1970 to 70 vessels in 1982, and the 
sardine fleet has doubled in the same period. Rapid development of national
effort has also taken place in some West African countries such as Morocco
and Senegal. That such developments are not a more general phenomenon
ref lects only the fact that developing a fisheries industry from scratch without
existing capacity, trained manpower and infrastructure is a very costly and time
consuming enterprise. Thus it has been estimated that the total capital 
investment required to finance full development of a national Namibian fishing
industry based on a 1.5 million ton catch would be of the order of US$ 450 million.
Where a coastal state is not yet in a position to take over itself the harvesting of the
resources, it may condition the access granted to foreign fleets on payment of access
fees, the formation of joint venture operations, or other benefits such as landing of catch
for local consumption or processing, employment of local crews and training of person-
nel. The benefits from licensing operations will obviously be less than the potential con-
tribution to the economy that could be obtained from a full national use of the resources.
A truly national fishing industry can contribute to solving nutritional needs, create 
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employment opportunities in the production and the supporting services, 
contribute to national income through wages and surpluses and earn foreign
exchange. The goal of most developing countries will therefore tend towards the
development of a full national utilisation. Licensing and joint venture arrangements
are usually viewed as intermediate steps towards this goal and can provide much
needed information on the fisheries and a means of transferring technology and
management skills and experience as well as purely financial benefits.
In recent years one can note various examples of advances for the 
developing countries in the financial benefits and the degree of control derived
from access licensing arrangements. In the Southwest Pacific for example licence
fees as percentage of landed catch value have risen from 2-3 percent under the
first licensing agreements at the outset of extended jurisdiction through 5 percent
under the arrangements of the early 1980s to over 10 percent under the new mul-
tilateral fisheries treaty with the USA. This latter figure is not yet representative for
all foreign fishing in the waters, but it is likely to be a future threshold for such
arrangements. The progress in this area has corne from a regional solidarity
expressed and implemented through a regional body, the South Pacific Fisheries
Agency and its program of harmonisation of fishery regimes.
Also off West Africa access fees have increased substantially in later years,
but full benefits are in this area partly restricted by inadequate systems for 
surveillance and control of the fisheries. Attempts to improve these situations are
being made through the formation of a regional body for cooperation in this field.
The South-West Indian Ocean has been the scene of considerably
increased foreign fishing activity over the last years, targeted mainly on tuna
resources. Here a study has shown that the Seychelles in addition to the license
fees, obtained considerable other benefits to the economy from the foreign 
fishing derived from the basing of operations and transhipment of fish.
In summary, then, after well over a decade of extended fisheries jurisdiction,
one cannot say that there has yet been a substantial "take over" of resources by
developing coastal states in the same way as developed fishing nations have
appropriated the resource wealth off their coasts. It is assumed that most 
developing coastal states still see a fully developed national fishing industry as
their main goal, but in most situations this will have to be realised in the long term.
In the meantime one can place on record examples that developing countries are
receiving greater benefits in terms of access fees and other benefits and that in
some regions the degree of control by coastal states over the present and poten-
tial use of the resources has increased. This is important among other reasons
because it helps preserve for the coastal state the option of national development.
Gunnar SAETERSDAL
(1) The actual title of the paper reads:"WORLD MARINE FISHERIES UNDER
THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: RESOURCE, MANAGEMENT AND UTILIZATION."
Titles and sub-titles are introduced by the editor.
(2) International Council for Exploration of the Sea.
(3) See Hardin Garet 1968
(4) North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission.




A fisherman in the harbour of Peniche (Portugal), repairing nets (photo: F. Bellec)
EUROPE BLEUE ET GESTION 
DE LA RESSOURCE
“En fait, les problèmes de ressources recouvrent des réalités
complètement différentes suivant que l’on se trouve aux
Philippines risquant sa vie pour pêcher quelques kilos de poisson
ou en Europe négociant autour d’une table une rallonge de 
quotas.” René-Pierre Chever, secrétaire général du Comité des 
pêches du Guilvinec (Finistère- France) rapelle içi que la 
problématique de la gestion de la ressource ne doit pas être
appréhendée seulement sous l’angle économique mais qu’il y a
aussi les pêcheurs. Leur avenir est lié à la conservation des
espèces et ils revendiquent un rôle dans la sauvegarde des
ressources halieutiques et de l’environnement.
Son intervention contribue aussi, de manière critique, à une
meilleure compréhension de la politique européenne en matière
de pêche,appelée encore “Europe bleue”. En même temps qu’elle
permet de cerner l’originalité de l’action d’une organisation de
pêcheurs face à cette politique.
P our mieux éclairer la problématique de la gestion de la ressource dans lesdifférentes régions du monde, il me parait important de mieux définir au
préalable quelques points forts de l’organisation à laquelle j’appartiens.
C’est une organisation démocratique interprofessionnelle, à base syndicale,
dotée de moyens financiers importants et de compétences très larges en matière de
développement et d’organisation de la filière pêche.
Nous sommes dans une région périphérique de l’Europe, à l’écart des grands
axes de développement industriel et financier du centre de la Communauté. Nous ne
pouvons compter que sur nous-mêmes, sur notre capacité d’organisation, d’innova-
tion, d’adaptation aux nouvelles contraintes et de proposition pour les atténuer. Notre
structure nous permet de rassembler les énergies et de créer.
Le point central de notre action est de contribuer à l’amélioration du niveau de
vie du pêcheur et à mieux rentabiliser les navires. Quand ces deux objectifs sont
atteints le moteur de l’économie locale est en route.
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Les responsables de notre organisation, estiment que pour mettre cette
machine en marche dans notre secteur, il faut quelques conditions favorables 
préexistantes.
Les intérêts objectifs
des pêcheurs de la planète convergent
Proscrire le monopole institutionnel et structurel est indispensable. Il est source de
sclérose, de manque d’initiative, de difficultés accrues pour les plus faibles, en définitive
de menace pour l’ensemble de la communauté. Nous préférons que plusieurs structures
même antagonistes travaillent sur le même secteur. Cela peut être source de conflit, de
perte de temps, mais cela oblige les structures à faire le maximum, à ne pas dormir sur
leur réussite passée, à écouter et à prendre en compte toutes les solutions face à une
difficulté. Lorsqu’un problème plus vaste se pose, ces structures qui peuvent s’affronter
en temps ordinaire se réunissent dans tous les cas pour faire face à une contrainte 
disproportionnée ou qui porte atteinte aux intérêts généraux des “fishworkers” 
(travailleurs de la pêche).
Un outil d’analyse socio-économique indépendant est aussi nécessaire.
Pertinent par ses travaux, voire impertinent avec les administrations françaises ou
européennes, il permet aux professionnels de notre communauté d’analyser les 
situations et d’y répondre au mieux de nos intérêts. La dépendance en cette matière
ne peut que nuire aux intérêts de la communauté des “fishworkers” dont la politique
quant au développement ou au maintien des activités dans certains cas, peut être 
différente de celle de l’Etat ou de la Communauté. L’observatoire socio-économique
permet de préparer les dossiers, des propositions fortes et argumentées, difficilement
contournables par les administrations. L’occupation de ce terrain habituellement
réservé aux “technocrates” est indispensable en fonction des moyens dont chaque
communauté dispose.
La pêche artisanale est une notion qui doit être définie avec beaucoup de 
précautions, surtout si on veut faire des comparaisons au niveau planétaire.
Certaines pêches artisanales sont très proches des pêches industrielles, et inverse-
ment. Certaines pêches artisanales détruisent plus de ressources que certaines
pêches industrielles. Certaines pêches industrielles sont pratiquees près des côtes,
alors que certaines pêches artisanales sont lointaines. Certains types de pêche 
artisanale bien que pouvant se pratiquer en famille se sont dotés de statuts d’entre-
prise, (ce qui est d’ailleurs souhaitable pour séparer le patrimoine “outil de travail” du
patrimoine familial) et certaines coopératives de pêcheurs font de l’armement à la
pêche industrielle. On pourrait multiplier ces exemples paradoxaux à l’infini. Il est
donc difficile de proposer une définition universelle du concept de “pêche artisanale”.
En ce qui nous concerne, nous préférons le concept d’une communauté voulant
vivre et travailler sur un littoral. Cela veut dire, que tous les “fishworkers” qui investis-
sent, travaillent dignes et responsables, vivant avec leur famille, dans une commu-
nauté de fait, font partie de “notre pêche artisanale”. Par opposition n’en font 
pas partie les investisseurs qui peuvent à tout moment, pour des raisons de
logiques financières qu’ils sont seuls à estimer, quitter le littoral ou investir 
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dans une autre activité plus rentable, laissant la communauté désemparée, sans
ressource et sans solution de rechange.
L’ouverture sur le monde est un devoir et une nécessité. Non seulement un
devoir moral car il est inadmissible que les 3/4 de la planète souffrent de problèmes
vitaux pendant que l’autre partie continue à s’enrichir dans sa tour d’ivoire, mais
également une nécessité en particulier sur le plan des marchés. Les pêcheurs des
pays développés ont intérêt à appuyer les pêcheurs des pays en voie de développe-
ment pour qu’ils vendent leur production dans leur région où c’est souvent cruelle-
ment nécessaire. Sinon cela se transforme en importation à bas prix concurrençant
les producteurs européens. Cette concurrence soutenue par des transformateurs peu
soucieux de la provenance des produits et des consommateurs peu informés de la
réalité des enjeux, conduit certains “penseurs” européens à se demander s’il est vrai-
ment indispensable de maintenir une pêche européenne et ses 200.000 pêcheurs.
Les intérêts objectifs des producteurs de la planète convergent. Ils faut d’abord en
prendre conscience et ensuite trouver une forme d’action réaliste et concrète.
La culture, la formation, l’information et la communication sont les valeurs fonda-
mentales du développement dans notre secteur. C’est l’investissement essentiel pour
les travailleurs du poisson, pêcheurs et transformateurs. Cette action en profondeur
permet déjà et permettra encore plus dans l’avenir à notre secteur de s’affirmer sans
passer par des intermédiaires dont la motivation n’est pas toujours claire. Elle perme-
ttra aussi, de faire face aux défis sans cesse lancés par la gestion de la ressource, par
les nouvelles donnes d’un marché européen et mondial. Cette volonté de développer
la culture, la formation, l’information et la communication permettra aux communautés
de”fishworkers” de prendre toute leur place dans une société européenne en perpé-
tuelle évolution qui marginalise très vite ceux qui sont différents, qui plus est dans une
région périphérique.
L’Europe: la pire et la meilleure des choses
La Communauté Economique Européenne créée par le Traité de Rome du 25
mars 1957 a donc un peu plus de 30 ans. Depuis, de nombreuses avancées 
successives ont été faites, en particulier en ce qui concerne la pêche, pour arriver
après l’entrée du Portugal et de l’Espagne dans l’Europe des douze, à une politique
des pêches qui s’impose de plus en plus par de multiples règlements.
Depuis le premier traité, l’instauration d’une ZEE (Zone Economique Exclusive)
commune, le Traité de Rome, l’Europe Bleue, la Politique Commune des Pêches,
l’Elargissement, l’Acte Unique, les pêches européennes ont vécu un bouleversement
total.
Ceci explique que les avis des pêcheurs au sujet de l’Europe sont controversés,
souvent émotionnels, car l’Europe parfois la pire, est aussi dans d’autres 
circonstances la meilleure des choses.
L’Europe est parfois la pire des choses. C’est souvent le point de vue du
pêcheur de base pour lequel l’Europe apporte un maximum de contraintes et un
minimum de satisfactions. C’est aussi le point de vue de nombreux respon-
SAMUDRA DOSSIER No 2
25
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
sables professionnels qui subissent presque toujours les règlements mis en
œuvre par la Commission des pêches, sans pouvoir anticiper ni les orienter.
Celle-ci produit, depuis les années 80 un nombre véritablement impressionnant
de réglementations sur tout et dans tous les domaines.
Certaines sont tellement technocratiques qu’elles ne sont pas applicables, en
particulier dans les zones où la pêche est mixte. Par exemple, les pêcheurs de 
langoustines dans le golfe de Gascogne doivent capturer au moins 30% de 
langoustines, mais pas plus de 60% d’espèces protégées par une taille marchande,
et moins de 30% de merlu. Comment fait-on pour mesurer cela en mer et prévoir ce
qui va rentrer dans le chalut?
A ce moment on touche du doigt le problème clef de l’Europe: il n’y a pas de
contact entre les décideurs, c’est-à-dire les technocrates de la Commission et ceux
qui doivent mettre en œuvre les règlements, les pêcheurs. Les membres de la
Commission, souvent des gens extrêmement compétents, ont mis l’Europe bleue sur
pied de leur bureau à Bruxelles, en fonction d’avis scientifiques plus ou moins
autorisés. Comment s’étonner ensuite qu’il y ait des problèmes d’application sur le
terrain! Pire, il semble anormal de demander une large concertation avant la 
rédaction de réglementations déterminantes !
Ce manque de contact avec les décideurs est encore amplifié par l’absence de
réels pouvoirs du parlement Européen. Il donne un avis, mais ne décide pas. La
Commission est finalement juge et partie. Tant qu’il n’y aura pas de contrôle 
démocratique réel sur l’exécutif de l’Europe la situation ne changera pas. Il faudrait
pour commencer cette évolution que la Commission soit élue par le parlement, qui
aurait de ce fait un véritable pouvoir de contrôle.
Le pêcheur de base ressent l’Europe comme la pire des choses dans tous les
domaines de son travail et de sa vie de tous les jours.
L’accès à la ressource, réglé sur le papier, ne l’est pas toujours dans la réalité.
Les palangriers espagnols occupent des zones immenses (des. dizaines de milles
carres) et en interdisent l’accès aux pêcheurs langoustiniers dont ce sont les zone
traditionnelles. Les quotas mis en place par Bruxelles sont une méthode de gestion
de la ressource qui ne l’est pas vraiment surtout pour les zones mixtes. Faut-il rejeter
le poisson mort, pêché avec l’espèce recherchée principalement, en cas d’atteinte
du quota? Le résultat est le même pour le stock. Les contrôles depuis la mise en
place de la CEE sont devenus extrêmement nombreux et sont lourds de 
conséquences pour les infractions même mineures. Les règlements sont tous 
compliqués et parfois inapplicables. Les patrons pêcheurs sont obligés de remplir de
nombreux documents y compris en mer, sur leur prises.
Dans le domaine social les pêcheurs français n’ont rien à attendre de bon de
l’Europe. Ils disposent du meilleur régime social, d’une retraite à 55 ans, 
d’organisations sociales qui fonctionnent bien. L’article 117 du Traité de Rome qui
prévoit l’harmonisation par le haut des régimes sociaux en Europe n’est pas
appliqué. On peut craindre que s’il y a harmonisation elle se fasse surtout par le bas.
L’investissement à la pêche, libre il y a encore un an, ne l’est plus. Les plans
pluri-annuels pour l’investissement mis au point par Bruxelles ont stoppé net les 
constructions de navire, au point que de nombreux chantiers navals 
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sont obligés de fermer. L’instauration d’un permis de mise en exploitation (PME), qui
n’est en fait qu’une licence déguisée, a modifié beaucoup de données. L’installation
des jeunes est très difficile. La transmission du bateau n’est possible qu’avec un PME,
le coût des bateaux d’occasion a augmenté de 40% en trois mois.
Le Marché Européen est avant tout un marché très ouvert et très demandeur. Les
pêcheurs voient avec une certaine amertume les prix de leurs produits stagner à un bas
niveau en raison des importations que la CEE admet, voire encourage.
L’administration de ce secteur d’activité est devenu encore plus compliquée que
par le passé. Les pêcheurs bénéficient des joies de l’administration verticale:
Bruxelles, Paris, la région, le département et enfin le quartier maritime.
La formation dont on pouvait espérer quelle soit la pierre angulaire de la 
politique de la CEE n’est que le parent pauvre de cette politique. Alors quelle est 
indispensable pour que l’intégration se fasse au mieux, surtout dans le domaine des
langues et de la communication.
En conclusion de ce point, il faut reconnaître que les pêcheurs subissent une
formidable évolution et que si on les interroge sur l’Europe ils ont de bonnes raisons
de considérer que c’est la pire des choses.
L’Europe dans d’autres circonstances est la meilleure des choses. Il y a 45 ans
l’Europe était à feu et à sang. Depuis, nous avons connu une période de calme et de
prospérité unique dans les annales de notre histoire. Cette évidence mérite d’être 
rappelée car c’est aussi dans ce contexte qu’il faut analyser la politique Européenne
des pêches, en relativisant les problèmes administratifs. La construction de l’Europe
nous a apporté le libre accès des eaux, une organisation des marchés, des 
structures, une gestion de la ressource, une organisation et le sentiment commun de
construire quelque chose d’important.   
Le libre accès aux eaux de la ZEE européenne est la base de l’Europe bleue.
Cette ZEE commune n’était pas une notion simple pour des gouvernements surtout
attentifs jusqu’à present à conserver leur souveraineté dans leurs eaux territoriales.
Le principe du libre accès souffre des exceptions puisque, d’une part il laisse hors
des eaux communes une bande de mer territoriale de 6 milles au moins et de 12
milles au plus en fonction des droits historiques de chaque Etat membre, et que
d’autre part le libre accès est limité dans les “box” qui ont été installés dans
plusieurs secteurs (Shetland, Irlande, par exemple), enfin les Espagnols ne 
pourront pêcher en Mer du Nord avant 2002. Maigre ces restrictions au libre accès,
qui disparaîtront selon un échéancier prévu par la CEE, on voit bien les énormes
avantages de cette ZEE commune. En ce qui nous concerne, nous pêchons 70%
de notre production hors de notre ZEE. Les pêcheurs ont la capacité d’évoluer dans
cet espace sans passer préalablement des accords avec chaque pays de 
la Communauté. Les organisations de pêcheurs des différents pays de la
Communauté  auraient passé leur temps à négocier ces contrats toujours remis en
question, alors que ce problème réglé, les structures peuvent se préoccuper de
tous les autres aspects de l’activité de la pêche, en particulier des marchés et du
domaine social.
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Le Marché Commun est d’abord une union douanière basée sur la 
circulation des marchandises, des hommes, des capitaux et sur une gestion
commune des relations commerciales avec le reste du monde. C’est aussi un
grand marché composé de 340 millions d’habitants. Le marché des produits de
la pêche s’inscrit dans ce nouvel espace. Là encore, on peut facilement voir que
ce grand espace facilite les échanges commerciaux entre les différents pays de
la Communauté. L’Acte Unique du 29 juin 1987 modifie le Traité de Rome en y
incluant des dispositions permettant un véritable grand marché en 1993.
L’importance de ce grand marché est inestimable pour notre communauté de
pêcheurs car nous exportons près de la moitié de notre production dans les pays
de la CEE, en particulier en Espagne. Avant l’entrée de l’Espagne dans la CEE
nous avions des problèmes permanents aux frontières, maintenant ils ont 
quasiment disparu. L’organisation des marchés en Europe est une réalité.
Presque tous les poissons ont un prix de retrait commun dans toute l’Europe,
discuté chaque année par les organisations de producteurs mises en place dans
chaque pays par port ou groupe de ports. Dans quelques mois l’ensemble des
normes sanitaires pour la pêche sera homogénéisé accélérant encore 
l’intégration de cet espace commercial. Ce grand marché européen même s’il
est ouvert aux importations a été, pour une grande part, dans le maintien du
revenu des pêcheurs de la Communauté.
La politique des structures, mise en place par Bruxelles, produit des effets
importants à la fois dans le financement des bateaux et des structures à terre.
Depuis la mise en place du volet structure, des centaines de bateaux français ont
été aidés à 25% de leur coût total. Si on peut se demander sur quels critères les
subventions sont distribuées, provoquant ici ou là des injustices flagrantes, on ne
peut nier l’impact de ces aides sur le financement des entreprises de pêche. Les
aides européennes ont été déterminantes dans la réalisation de restructurations
lourdes dans les ports, en particulier en participant d’une façon importante à la
modernisation des criées. Ces aides ont modifié le paysage de la pêche française.
La gestion de la ressource est sans doute le secteur ou l’action de la CEE à été
la plus volontariste, même si cela est diversement apprécié par les pêcheurs . Le
règlement n° 171/83, abondamment complété depuis, définit, pour l’ensemble de la
ZEE européenne et pour tous les pêcheurs, l’ensemble des mesures techniques 
d’utilisation des engins de pêche. Aussi contraignant qu’il soit, on peut être certain que
la situation, sans l’existence de la Communauté, aurait été pire. Chaque pays aurait
du prendre pour sa propre ZEE des mesures de sauvegarde de sa ressource. On
peut être convaincu que ces réglementations n’auraient pas été les mêmes et que les
problèmes d’ application auraient été bien pires, les contrôles bien plus sévères,
l’incompréhension totale. Cela aurait conduit, à la longue, à déserter certains lieux de
pêche traditionnels.
L’organisation professionnelle des pêcheurs européens existe. La CEE a mis
sur pied les organisations de producteurs par port ou par région. Celles-ci se sont
regroupées sur le plan français, puis sur le plan européen pour constituer l’AEOP(1).
Cette structure est consultée parla Commission et le Parlement Européen. La CEE
n’a pas pour autant supprimé les structures déjà existantes.
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Etripage de poissons à bord d’un chalutier de pêche artisanale au large des côtes bretonnes.
(Photo F. Bellec)
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L’Europe peut être la meilleure des choses pour les pêcheurs si elle arrive à
prendre en compte les aspects humains et sociaux qui restent toujours en arrière.
Pour le reste on peut se féliciter de sa mise en place, en étant conscient que le
secteur de la pêche détient une responsabilité particulière dans la construction
européenne. Les pêcheurs qui naviguent dans la ZEE commune sont européens par
nature. La politique de l’Europe bleue est en fait en avance sur la future integration
des autres secteurs de l’Europe, les pêcheurs ont, à ce titre, un rôle important à jouer,
ce dont ils sont conscients.
La ressource: mythes et aspects concrets
La ressource est un mot qui reviendra souvent au cours de ce Symposium. Il 
suscite autant d’inquiétude que de passion. Tout serait simple s’il s’agissait de banales
opérations arithmétiques. Ce n’est pas le cas, notre expérience démontre que lorsque
nous abordons ce problème nous mélangeons à la fois des mythes et des réalités.
Ressource, mais aussi coopération, coopérative, petit pêcheur, pêche artisanale
ou industrielle, etc... sont des mots tabous. A chacun de nous ils évoquent quelque
chose d’assez clair, malheureusement la plupart du temps, ce n’est pas le même 
concept que nous mettons derrière le même mot. Ceci est évident pour la
“ressource”. En fait, les problèmes de ressources recouvrent des realités 
complétement différentes suivant que l’on se trouve aux Philippines risquant sa vie
pour pêcher quelques kilos de poisson, ou en Europe négociant autour d’une table
une rallonge de quotas. Deux points nous paraissent mériter un éclairage particulier:
la notion de conservation des ressources et celle de la ressource “bien collectif”.
La conservation de la ressource n’est pas pour nous une fin en soi. Bien 
souvent les scientifiques et les administrations nous ont présenté le problème de
cette façon, oubliant qu’il y a aussi des pêcheurs, une filière, des problèmes
économiques et sociaux. L’exemple du hareng en mer du Nord est particulièrement
significatif. Il y avait effectivement un gros problème de stock, mais la fermeture dra-
conienne pendant 5 ans a eu comme résultat de modifier les habitudes alimentaires
des consommateurs traditionnels du hareng qui se sont détournés vers des produits
de substitution. Lorsque la pêche à été ré-ouverte, il y avait beaucoup de harengs
dans la mer mais plus de marché. Résultat final pour le pêcheur et les travailleurs de
la filière: moins de revenu, alors que le stock est en bonne santé. Sans doute 
aurait-il fallu agir plus tôt, en imaginant un système de réduction des captures qui
n’aurait peut-être pas permis au stock de se reconstituer aussi vite, mais qui aurait
permis de conserver un marché. Nous souhaitons, à chaque fois que les problèmes
de conservation de la ressource sont abordés, qu’une approche bio-économique soit
la règle du jeu. C’est souvent plus complexe, plus long à mettre en œuvre, mais il ne
sert a rien de conserver une ressource en étranglant les pêcheurs.
La ressource est un bien collectif de la population du globe, mais dans les 
faits elle appartient surtout à celui qui la prend. La plupart du temps, les problèmes 
de ressources sont des problèmes de compétition entre différents types de 
pêche, surtout entre la pêche industrielle et la pêche artisanale locale. Le 
problème n’est donc pas directement une question de ressource mais de savoir quel
est l’objectif de la capture de la ressource. S’agit-il de rentabiliser 
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au mieux un capital industriel investi momentanément dans la pêche, ou s’agit-il de
fournir à une communauté vivant sur le littoral un travail durable, utile à une 
communauté plus large sur le plan de l’alimentation? La réponse à cette question
montre que le problème doit être posé en amont de la ressource. Ce bien collectif,
convoité, doit être mis à la disposition de ceux qui en ont besoin pour vivre avant tout.
Il faut, en fait, que les petits pêcheurs exigent et obtiennent, non pas l’appropriation
de ce bien collectif, mais sa mise à disposition, son usage. Cela est possible par une
organisation forte et reconnue.
Le danger de disparition d’un stock donné n’existe pratiquement plus en Europe,
en raison des mécanismes de gestion mis en place par la CEE, du fait que la pêche
s’exerce souvent sur des zones mixtes et que nous avons sans doute exporté une 
partie de nos problèmes vers les pays en voie de développement, en multipliant les
accords de pêche avec eux. Cependant la gestion de cette ressource nous pose de 
difficiles problèmes. Ils se rencontrent à plusieurs niveaux: l’accès réel à certaines
zones, la gestion des quotas, la gestion de zones mixtes, la gestion des zones côtières.
L’accès à toutes les zones de pêche est théoriquement libre, cependant de
graves conflits locaux peuvent surgir, en raison essentiellement de l’utilisation d’engins
de pêche incompatibles dans la même zone. Les Espagnols ont développé une pêche
palangrière dans le golfe de Gascogne, très efficace, pratiquée essentiellement sur le
merlu par des bateaux en acier de 30 à 45 m de long, avec 15 à 25 hommes à bord.
Ces bateaux pêchent souvent en groupe et mouillent 20 à 50 KM de palangre à merlu
par jour. Des zones entières sont, de ce fait, barrées et les navires espagnols en
assurent avec une extrême vigilance la surveillance, interdisant l’accès de ces zones
aux autres navires de la Communauté, en particulier les chalutiers français (12 à 15
m), dont ce sont les zones traditionnelles langoustinières. Cette “protection” est
assurée “manu militari” en intimidant d’abord les petits chalutiers français, ensuite en
les abordant si nécessaire. Pendant deux ans nous n’avons dû notre salut qu’à la fuite
en cas de conflit direct car le rapport des forces était en notre défaveur. Cela jusqu’au
mois de Mai 89 où 15 palangriers espagnols se sont retrouvés bloqués pendant une
journée par 200 petits chalutiers bretons. Les palangriers ont quitté la zone, mais ce
conflit aurait pu dégénérer en un drame de la mer. Les chalutiers sont ensuite allés 
bloquer le départ d’une course transatlantique Lorient - Saint Bartélémi 
(Bermudes) -Lorient. Tous les média français et internationaux se trouvaient là, le 
ministre de la mer également venu donner le départ de la course. Les pêcheurs ont
négocié avec le ministre toute la journée et ont réussi à obtenir l’accord suivant:
“A l’occasion de la réunion approfondie qu’il a eue avec les pêcheurs artisans
du Morbihan et du Finistère, le Ministre délégué, chargé de la mer, M.Jacques Mellick,
s’engage:
A la présence sur zone, d’un bâtiment de la Marine Nationale, des Douanes ou
des Affaires Maritimes, aussi longtemps que la situation le justifiera et d’un avion pour
localiser la présence de la flotte espagnole.
A faire reprendre les négociations entre professionnels français et espagnols
sur la cohabitation des métiers dans la zone 8 exclusivement et sur la 
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base du projet de code de bonne conduite établi à Ciboure, le 2 décembre 
1988. Le Ministre espagnol de la pêche avait donné son accord sur ce point
lors du séminaire gouvernemental franco-espagnol de Leone.
A intervenir auprès du Ministre espagnol de la pêche pour favoriser la 
représentation des patrons pêcheurs dans la négociation.
A tenir une réunion de travail au Ministère de la Mer, avec les professionnels 
artisans pour rechercher des propositions d’aménagement du plan d’orientation 
pluri-annuel, dans le cadre de la réouverture du dossier qui interviendra pendant la
présidence française de la CEE.”
Ce problème que nous venons de vivre montre bien la complexité de la notion
d’accès théoriquement réglée par la CEE, mais montre aussi qu’il y a en définitive 
toujours une solution négociée possible.
La gestion des quotas, simple sur le papier, pose de grave problèmes concrets.
Nous avons plusieurs espèces à quota sensible dans certaines zones CIEM(2) en
Europe, en particulier sur la sole en Zone VIII, c’est-à-dire dans le golfe de Gascogne.
Ces quotas sont déterminés à partir des TAC(3) évalués par les scientifiques
européens, et sont basés sur les déclarations des captures effectuées par les navires.
Notre quota est de 4.400 tonnes pour 1989. Mais plusieurs facteurs convergent pour
que nous ayons des problèmes sur ce quota. D’abord les déclarations de capture ne
sont pas nécessaires pour les petits bateaux (5 à 10 m), or il y en a des milliers dans
cette zone, de gros bateaux viennent d’armer pour cette pêche surtout aux filets, le
temps à été exceptionnellement beau depuis le début de l’année. Pour éviter le
dépassement du quota en milieu d’année nous avons procédé à une répartition port
par port en fonction des antériorités des trois années passées. Chaque port ou
groupe de ports est ainsi responsable de la gestion de son quota avec ses pêcheurs.
Cela n’empêchera vraisemblablement pas les problèmes dans certains secteurs mais
au moins les choses sont claires et entre les mains des professionnels.
La gestion des zones mixtes, c’est à dire des zones où l’on pêche une espèce
principale comme la langoustine mais aussi de nombreuses espèces protégées, en
particulier le merlu, est très compliquée. Que fait-on de ce qui rentre en trop dans
le chalut? On le rejette! Mais n’est-il pas mort? Bien évidemment! N’a-t-il pas un
marché important? Bien évidemment! Mais on le rejette quand même aux mouettes
et aux goélands ! Cela n’est pas acceptable pour un patron pêcheur qui est avant
tout un chef d’entreprise, préoccupé par la rentabilité de son bateau et pour des
matelots attentifs à leur salaire. C’est d’autant plus difficile à subir que les marins
sont d’accord de mettre en œuvre d’autres méthodes pour préserver réellement le
stock. Ils ont mis au point avec les scientifiques d’IFREMER(4) un chalut sélectif qui
permet de protéger les petits merlus, sans rejeter à l’eau du poisson mort et 
commercialisable. La gestion des zones côtières, c’est-à-dire la bande de 0 à 12
milles, nous pose d’énormes problèmes. Autant la ZEE (12 à 200 milles) est 
super-réglementée et finalement pas trop mal gérée, autant la bande côtière est
laissée à l’abandon. Ceci s’explique par le fait que depuis 12 ans toute l’énergie à
été mise au service de l’Europe bleue et que la gestion de la bande côtière est
restée de côté. Il y a de très nombreux bateaux et marins individuels (12.000 sur
18.000 en France) qui pratiquent toutes sortes de métiers. Cette zone est extrême- 
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ment importante pour de nombreuses raisons. Presque tous les poissons de haute
mer y passent une partie de leur cycle biologique, il faut donc les protéger. Les
pêcheurs de cette zone ont un rôle irremplaçable à jouer en matière de défense de
l’environnement, dès qu’il y a un problème de qualité des eaux ou de pollution ils
interviennent très vite. Enfin ils sont les gardiens d’un lieu convoité par de 
nombreuses autres industries, tourisme, nucléaire, chimie etc... Notre travail devra
porter dans les années qui viennent sur cette bande côtière et ces pêcheurs, en les
organisant au mieux, en mettant en place des schémas de mise en valeur de la mer
côtière, en faisant des études stock par stock, zone par zone.
En conclusion de ce dernier point, il nous parait important de souligner qu’en
matière de ressources la modestie est de rigueur, les évidences sont souvent
trompeuses. Il parait cependant évident que les pays du Tiers Monde doivent obtenir
immédiatement l’usage maximum de leurs ressources, en ayant les moyens d’en






(Titres et intertires de la rédaction).
(1) AEOP : Association Européenne des Organisations de
Producteurs.
(2) CIEM : Comité International pour l’Exploitation des Mers.
(3) TAC : Total Allowed Catches.
(4) IFREMER : Institut Français de Recherche pour l’Exploitation
de la Mer.
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The Grass Roots and the State
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF
FISHING
Gisli Pálsson is professor at the Faculty of Social Science of
the University of Reykjavik (Iceland). In the following article,
which was prepared specially for the Lisbon Symposium
(Portugal – June 1989), he pleads for the eminent social and 
political character of ecology, more particularly within the sector
of marine resource management. He does not hesitate to take a
dissident position on the thesis of the ’Tragedy of the Commons’.
He argues that the protection of marine resources has always
been and still is part and parcel of indigenous or ‘traditional’
management schemes within the artisanal fisheries sector.
This article represents an important contribution to the 
research on marine resource management and the ecology of
fishing.
T his paper emphasises the importance, for management purposes, of considering the larger social context of resource use and the need for 
cooperation between the grass roots and the state. I argue that the popular
thesis which hold that all resources owned in common must inevitably become
over-exploited – the thesis of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’(Hardin 1968) – fails
to account for the social aspect of production and resource management. Human
ecology, the study of how humans use nature and what they do to themselves,
nature, and society in the process (see Bennett 1976:3), I suggest, is 
necessarily political or social ecology, since humans appropriate nature as social
beings in an institutional context of their own design. As Marx argued, ”nature....
taken abstractly for itself and fixed in isolation from man – is nothing for man”.
I will illustrate my argument with detailed reference to Icelandic fishing.
The national economy of Iceland is heavily dependent on fishing. This means
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that government policy must be responsive to ’grass roots politics’ and the
‘needs’ of the fishing industry. Also, since Iceland is a small country, with a 
population of 240.000 people, the distance between management and fishing,
between bureaucrats and workers, is relatively short. For these reasons, the
Icelandic fishing industry is an interesting example.
Stated objectives and unstated objectives
The implications of management are visible at different levels of society; the
political ecology of fishing is more or less the same as the political economy of
the country. I argue, Icelandic fisheries management incorporates local demands
and initiative to a very high degree. However, in the case of the new quota System
in cod fishing, introduced in 1983, a structural transformation seems to be taking
place with grave consequences for small-scale production. I conclude that an 
efficient and responsible fisheries policy must seriously consider the social
context of the fishing industry.
In recent years, the thesis of the ’Tragedy of the Commons’ has 
increasingly come under attack. In particular, it has been argued, it wrongly
assumes that the users of commons are necessarily selfish, autonomous 
individuals trying to maximise short-term gains, and that solutions to the 
commons dilemma can only be solved through the intervention of an external
authority, the state or some multinational body (see McCay and Acheson 1987).
In some indigenous or ‘traditional’ management schemes, local groups of users
successfully control the reproduction of renewable resources without external
intervention (see Durrenberger and Pálsson 1987, Ruddle and Akimichi 1984). In
some cases, too, groups of users act together with a national authority, 
effectively ’co-managing’ local resources (Jentoft 1989).
But while co-management is an attractive approach to environmental pr
oblems, it is not without difficulties, if only for the fact that important change is not
always anticipated. A distinction can be made between the stated objectives of
management schemes, unstated objectives, and unintended side effects (see
Young 1983). Usually the stated objectives of management proposals are to bring
the industry under control, to promote conservation and sustained yield, and to
ensure reasonable returns to the average fisherman. Often there are also 
important unstated objectives which tend to reflect the special interests of particular
groups. Those responsible for fisheries management are often faced with serious
value judgments concerning the ‘fair’ distribution of resources and income. The 
formation of policies therefore tends to involve politically sensitive issues.
The stated objectives of entry restrictions, for instance, may be to make
participation more lucrative for those who get the permission to fish, while the
unstated objectives may be simply to restrict competition, to secure the position
of a class of users, to maintain a particular balance of power, and to provide a
guarantee against radical changes in the organisation of the industry.
Innovation often also involves some unintended side effects. Research into
some of the effects of limited-entry schemes is revealing in this respect. In
some cases, in Alaska for instance, the operation of a market in fishing permits
has resulted in windfall profits associated with entry permits and significant
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changes in the composition of the group of permit holders. Increasingly, fishing
has become monopolised by well-organised business firms, while 
individuals who identify themselves as fishermen and regard fishing as a way
of life are put aside (Young 1983). This has of course far-reaching 
consequences for the social structure of local communities.
A number of case studies of the social aspects of fisheries management are
already available (see, for instance, Pollnac and Littlefield 1983, Sinclair 1983,
Young 1983, Lamson and Hanson 1984). Together they show that even though
biological and economic aspects of fisheries often pose major problems for 
management, its social aspects are no less important. To manage only fishing
itself is to manage a fraction of the industry. In fact, some of the barriers for the
success of management schemes may lie in the management organisations
themselves, in the organisational context of fisheries research and policy making.
Knowledge about the functioning of innovating organisations and the construction
of knowledge in bureaucratic institutions, may be just as important as knowledge
about fishing stocks and the people who exploit them (Parades 1985:177).
The ”rowing time”
In Iceland governmental decisions influence all sectors of fishing industry,
and consequently those involved organise to affect government policy in their
favour. Some of these organisations are formal and permanent associations,
such as associations of fishermen and boat owners, the various groups of 
processors, and the various departments of the semi-governmental Fisheries
Association (Fiskifélag Islands), which embraces many of the interested groups
involved. All of these groups and associations take part in a complicated political
process, the results of which change from one season to another. Administrative
regulations are made within the framework of a general body of legislation,
passed by Parliament in 1976 to regulate fishing within Icelandic waters. These
regulations are changed in response to the condition of the stocks, as evaluated
by the biologists of the Marine Research Institute, and the demands of various
contending groups. Some of these regulations respond only to the demands of
local fishermen, whereas others meet the recommendations of the biologists.
These regulations are the results of a series of compromises among local 
branches of the Fisheries Association and different interest groups.
Cod (Gadus morhua) has always been the most important species 
exploited by Icelandic fishermen. The size of the stock is subject to periodic 
fluctuations which are largely independent of humans, but human exploitation has
its effect too. During the first decades of the twentieth century the fishing effort
multiplied as trawlers and motorboats replaced open rowing boats. The new 
vessels extended the range of exploitation of the fisheries resources. At the same
time a dynamic market economy replaced the stagnant household economy of
earlier centuries. In 1944 Iceland gained full independence from Denmark. The
first independent government of Iceland was committed to a policy of economie
development and concentrated on the fishing industry as a means to that end.
Full-time fishing was rapidly becoming the livelihood of Icelanders and the focus
of government development policy.
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Not surprisingly, increased fishing effort has resulted in periodic declines in
catches. The cod catch on Icelandic fishing grounds decreased from 1933 to
World War II, but during the war the stock recovered. After that the Icelandic fleet
expanded and foreign fleets resumed fishing. From 1955 to 1975 the fishing effort
doubled, but despite this increase in effort Icelandic catches fell from 306.000 to
266.000 tons. This process led to a classic open-access, common-property
tragedy. The opportunistic exploitation of fishing stocks by freely competing 
skippers who tried to get what they could from the sea while stocks lasted, led to
sharply diminished returns. The ‘natural’ limit to over-exploitation, the ‘maximum
sustainable yield’, had been exceeded.
Responding to recognition of this tragedy and the pressures of 
fishermen, the Icelandic government took the international move of trying to
expand its jurisdiction and exclude foreign fishing vessels from waters around
Iceland. It drew Great Britain into ‘cod wars’ that resulted in the exclusion of
British trawlers from Icelandic fishing grounds in December 1976. The task of
restoring depleted stocks and preventing future tragedies remained. It resulted in
increased use of scientific models and policies for fisheries management within
Iceland’s domain. Iceland’s fishermen had to accept constraints on their activities.
The history of Icelandic fishing provides several examples of co-manage-
ment and democratic solutions. The co-ordination of the ‘rowing time’ in line 
fishing is a case in point. As more and more boats entered line fishing during the
first decades of this century there was increased competition for fishing space
both within and between fishing communities. The lines of each boat could stretch
several miles, and when different boats left the harbour at different times, 
competing for similar locations, lines got chopped and intermingled, especially in
strong currents. No one benefited. Fishermen agreed that a collective response
was necessary.
Regulations concerning the timing of departure (’rowing time’) were laid
down by common agreement in 1930s. The fishermen agreed to fix a certain time
for departure for each month. The precise times were debated for years, but most
fishermen favoured some regulations. Because the lines were taken ashore for
baiting after each trip, it was impossible for anyone to control a particular path.
The fisherman’s regulations were rectified by law in 1945, but the details have
been changed several times. In this episode, we see recognition of a common
problem and a collective but informai solution that later attained the status of law.
It shows the ability of fishermen to translate common interest into common rules
sanctioned and enforced by the state.
Even though government policy in Iceland is generally responsive to local
demands, as the case of the ‘rowing time’ illustrates, it is not necessarily
equally responsive to the demands of different kinds of production units. In the
case of the new quota system in cod fishing, an apparently neutral and 
tech-nical solution to the problem of management has resulted in a massive
trans-fer of power and capital. The threat of overfishing has usually been met
with measures that do not discriminate between groups of fishermen. Thus, for
some years the government tried to put a ceiling on the total catch of cod by
deciding upon the length of the winter season and by closing particular popular
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fishing areas. Such measures affected most fishermen in a similar way. 
In-deed, there seems to have been general agreement among fishermen that
no one should be denied access to the fish. The solutions tended to be ones
that guaranteed that the benefits and the costs were spread among all the
fishermen rather than concentrated among a few, even though the latter choice
might be simpler to design, administer, and enforce and might ensure a more
coherent management policy. Generally, fishermen saw the policy of licensing
as a threat that would undermine the previously held assumptions about equal
access. With the introduction of the quota System in cod fishing, this context
has been radically changed. As a resuit, a new differentiation is taking place.
Bound to favour the wealthy speculators
While capitalist production has been subject to an intricate 
institutionalised machinery since the last ‘Cod War’, the present system of 
management was introduced late in 1983, when it became clear that the 
prevailing fishing policy needed to be changed. By then the total annual cod
catch was even less than the amount recommended by fisheries biologists, and
the forecast for 1984 was bleak. The government decided to reduce the cod
quota for 1984 to 220.000 tons, from an estimated catch of around 290.000 tons.
At the annual conference of the Fisheries Association, most interest groups were
rather unexpectedly in favour of a boat-quota System that would divide this
reduce catch within the industry itself. The precise allocation of quotas was
debated, but each boat was to be allocated an annual quota on the basis of its
average catch over the past three years.
This meant that some ships would get higher quotas than the rest of the
fleet, a fundamental departure from traditional policy. The individual quota system
was recommended by the fishing industry and administered by the Ministry of
Fisheries. The maximum catch of each boat is decided upon in advance, largely
on the basis of its catch in the past. This policy has been re-evaluated every year,
but the system remains more or less the same. By now, there is emerging a rather
clear picture of the long-term effects of the quota system on the structure of the
industry. The political debate is not so much concerned with the technical details
of quota allocation, but rather with the large-scale social and political 
consequences of the system . The most serious criticism of the present system is
that it transfers immense resources into the hands of a relatively small group of
people, the boat owners (Helgason 1987).
During the cod wars Iceland claimed national ownership of the fishing
stocks in coastal waters, a highly valuable resource. The quota system divides
access to this resource among those who happened to be boat owners when
the system was introduced, and this privileged access is free of charge. In-
creasingly, this ‘gift’ from the state is being transferred into capital. On the one
hand, boat owners may sell their boats and thereby their share of the catch.
On the other hand, they may sell their quota for any one year, or part of it, that
is rent out the catch they are entitled to. In both cases an independent market
has developed whereby boat owners are able to turn their free licenses into
profits in accordance with the laws of supply and demand. There are reports
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of vessels being sold at a price which is two or even three times that of their
‘real’ value.
Permanent access to the resource, therefore, is no less valuable in 
mone-tary terms than the vessel itself. The temporary transfer of quotas, that is
between vessels, is subject to some restrictions and it is difficult to estimate the
amount of capital involved in such transactions, but a sizable part of the annual
quota, possibly one quarter, is already changing hands. In 1984, 11.6% of the
total vessel quota changed hands, and 13.5% in 1985 (see Arnason 1986). Given
the price of a permanent license, embodied in the excessive value of fishing 
vessels on the free market, one can assume that temporary tenure is generally
being sold at very high prices. The estimated total value of outstanding quotas in
1984 was 24 million US $ and 35 million in 1985 (Arnason 1986). These figures
indicate, Arnason argues, the economic rents produced by the quota System.
These transactions are likely to have profound implications for the distribution
of power and income, and indeed the whole structure of Icelandic society. In
Iceland there is a fundamental difference between two groups of producers: 
independent skipper-owners and capitalistic firms (Pálsson 1982, Durrenberger
and Pálsson 1985). Independent boat owners typically own the smaller vessels.
They tend to have permanent crews from one season to another. Their production
is usually an integral part of their domestic economy, the household, and they
make no clear distinction between work and leisure. Fishing is a way of life and not
simply a source of income. The capitalistic vertically integrated firms, on the other
hand, combine trawling on larger vessels and the freezing of the catch. On these
vessels there is a high turnover of crew men from one time to another. The 
business has to conform to the strict laws of the market for capital and labour.
When fishing becomes unproductive, the owners have two choices : to transfer
their capital to more profitable endeavour, or to lobby for protection from the state
(for an other context see, for instance, Barrett 1984, and Davis 1904).
With the quota System, a permanent right to fish has not only been given to
an exclusive group, but this right is increasingly being turned into marketable
commodity. As access has to be bought and prices of boats and quotas are 
subject to the mechanism of the market, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
newcomers to enter the industry. In the past, successful skippers were often able
to become boat owners and a relatively large proportion of the fleet is still the
property of share-holding companies of crew men and their families. In a few
years it will be extremely difficult for skippers to start their own business, since the
present system is bound to favour the wealthy speculators. The independent 
skipper-owner is likely to become obsolete.
Alternative management schemes are now being discussed. There are
demands for a return to the System prior to the introduction of quotas, but this
is unlikely, given the inadequacies, in economic and ecological terms, of the
previous system. Also, there are demands for communal quotas where local
authorities would be given a certain amount of autonomy as regards the 
allocation of quotas, a limited revival of the grass roots politics of earlier
decades. Furthermore, some critics of the present system favour public 
auctions of quotas, whereby the state would receive incomes in return for the 
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selling of the right to fish. The demands for alternative policies are partly a
response to recent developments in marketing and processing.
Over the last years boat owners have sold part of their cod catch directly to
foreign markets, approximately 8% in 1985 and 12% in 1986. As the marketing and
processing of a significant part of the catch takes place abroad, employment is
being reduced domestically. Some people have therefore questioned the privileged
access of the ’lords of the sea’ to the most valuable national resource, arguing that
fishing could become like third world mining where raw materials are exported with
little returns to the domestic economy. While this is unlikely, the sheer possibility of
such a development has called for a redefinition of the notion of ‘interest group’. No
longer is it seen to be restricted to boat owners and fishermen. Already workers in
fish processing plants are demanding their share of the cake.
The main stated objective of the quota System was to control the total 
annual catch and to make fishing more economical. The cost side of the econom-
ic equation has been significantly reduced (see Helgason and Olafsson 1987).
However there has been less success as regards the ecological objective.
Generally, the total annual catch of cod is higher than that recommended by the
marine biologists and the proportion of immature cod in the catch has been
increasing. It is rather surprising, then, that politicians have been willing to 
institutionalise a system so costly in social terms, given its limited success in
securing the reproductive potential of the stock. As we have seen, the quota 
system has favoured some groups of producers over others. Apparently neutral
management decisions have had important effects on the balance of power and
the structure of the fishing industry by changing the possibilities and alternatives
with respect to access to fish. This transformation was, perhaps, unforeseen.
However, a policy of fisheries research and management which ignores the social
context of the industry is bound to generate much unforeseen change. A
narrowly technical approach to the problems of management always invites the
kind of morality epitomised in the words the songwriter Tom Lehrer credits to the
nuclear technicians : “Once the rockets are up, who cares where they corne down?’
Social construction of ecological knowledge
In Iceland, the understanding of fish and fishing activities has undergone a
series of transformations with the development of economic and social relations
(see Pálsson 1989). Fishermen and the generai public regarded the first marine
biologists as strange and eccentric men who operated on fish and “spent hours
fiddling with all kinds of disgusting little things” (Hagalin 1964:321). The
disrespect seems to have been mutual. One of the pioneers in marine biology
was said to “have quickly realised that various kinds of super-stitious beliefs
prevented the natural development of this important industry” (Bergsson
1940:240). With the threat of over-exploitation of fishing stocks, and the
institutionalisation of fisheries that followed, the ‘scientific’ notion of homeostatic
fisheries began to replace earlier rationalities of fishing. As the state became
increasingly involved in the making of the industry, the balance of power shifted
in favour of the biologists. This, of course, is not peculiar to
SAMUDRA DOSSIER No 2
41
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Iceland. While some marine biological research occurred in Iceland already at the
beginning of the twentieth century, full-time research started later, in the 1940s.
The present Marine Research Institute was established in 1965.
Since the introduction of the quota System politicians and biologists have
cooperated closely. The politicians need the scientific arguments and therefore
encourage research. However, they have often regarded the biologists’
measurements and analyses with suspicion. Former Ministers of Fisheries have
argued that if the scientists had been right in their estimates and predictions, the
fisheries would have collapsed. Contrary to the ‘Black Report’ predictions of 1975,
a report of the Marine Research Institute that was influential in the cod wars, the
cod stock remained fairly stable until a sharp decline in catches in 1982. One 
former Minister has referred to the ‘regional of the biologists’. Another former
Minister of Fisheries points out that ’in the biologists’ own calculations, the size of
the 1976 year class of cod keeps increasing’ (see Sjávarfréttir 1980:17).
Fishermen frequently complain that “nowadays everything is being 
ban-ned”. The biologists are usually the target of fishermen’s criticism since all
major decisions are based on their models and forecasts. Some have complained
that all initiative is being taken from fishermen. Others question the basic
assumptions of biologists and managers. One skipper has argued, for instance,
that “knowledge of fish migrations and the size of different stocks is still infinitely
small” and that “those who have come to know the fishing grounds around
Iceland, during a lifelong career in fishing, must become mute when the wise men
(spekingar) announce their precise measurements of the stocks, to the ton”
(Hermannsson 1984). It is understandable that skippers, aware of the discrepancy
between reality and the ‘pessimistic’ forecasts of the past, fail to be impressed with
the rhetoric of the scientists. As one skipper commented, “They always knew about
all this fish. They only used the ‘Black Report’ to scare the British away”.
The proposals put forward by the marine biologists have been met with
distrust and emotional reaction among fishermen. During the last cod wars, the
fishermen tended to regard internai limitations to access with some 
scepti-cism, arguing that if they didn’t catch the fish, the British and Germans
would anyway. Once the common enemy disappeared, conflict between 
fishermen and biologists increased. Fishermen have become increasingly
dominated by techno-scientific knowledge and the agencies of the state.
Confronted with the details of scientific research, fishermen have become
powerless, in their words ‘mute’. Management becomes increasingly the 
business of wise men who speak a strange language. Their language and 
wisdom is not, as is often assumed, unaffected by the social context in which
it is produced and used. Research is subject to immense political pressures.
Knowledge, it may be argued, the knowledge of scientists no less than that of
fishermen, is socially constructed.
In the modem world, reality is increasingly defined by full-time scientific
experts, who monopolise ‘universe-maintenance’, to borrow the jargon of Berger
and Luckman (1966). Their knowledge is often conceived as an ‘objective’
representation of the physical world. Such a view of the scientific enterprise
needs to be re-evaluated. It is important to recognise that ecological 
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facts do not speak for themselves and that ecological realities are inevitably
socially constructed. Worster has shown, for instance, that ecological ideas are
rooted in their times and that scientists cannot isolate their perception of nature
from the rest of their mental life. “The history of ecology”, he says, “shows how
impossible it has been, even when men have most desired it, to screen out...
biases. Any attempt to so divorce nature from the rest of human condition leads
to a doctrine of alienation, where the science must occupy one realm and the
social and historical consciousness another”(Worster 1977:345).
The need for a sociological analysis
The thesis which suggests that access to the ocean is open for anyone in
most fishing societies, and that this is the root of all environmental problems, is
contrary to the facts. Anthropological studies have shown that in many fishing
societies people have developed indigenous means of regulating access to 
fishing grounds – sometimes for the purpose of preventing over-exploitation. In
industrial societies, indigenous management methods are often combined with or
replaced by public policies – regional, national or even international ones. People
opt for public solutions because of the complexity of industrial fishing systems
and the need for striking a balance between different political factions and 
interest groups.
Some of the major problems of fisheries policy concern the relationship
between the local level and the national level – between the grass roots and the
state. Public policies, by definition, remove decision making from the local
community, but to be effectively constructed and implemented policy must 
somehow ensure feedback between the two levels of government. Even though
major decisions are taken by regional or national agencies, it is possible to 
incorporate informai, indigenous management techniques in the planning
process. As we have seen the history of Icelandic fishing provides several 
examples of democratic solutions to management problems.
While the extraction of food from the sea seems to present somewhat similar
problems in most societies and people seem to deal with them in similar ways
(Acheson 1981), one should not overemphasise the common characteristics of
fishing societies. After all there are substantial differences between fisheries, even
within the same society. The process of extraction may be the same, but social
relations are often very different since people organise their production in various
ways. Indeed, one of the significant differences in fishing systems concèrns the
nature of production units. While in industrial societies production is usually geared
for the market, the units of production may differ widely in terms of organisation,
ideologies and motives. It is important, not the least for practical purposes, to pay
attention to such differences . Organisations have systematic properties, and any
management scheme is consequently likely to have repercussions beyond the
narrow context of implementation. Also, the perception of environmental problems
is likely to vary from one type of organisation to another. One type of organisation
may encourage fishermen to define environmental conditions as problematic and
to take direct action to redress the balance. Another type of organisation may do
just the opposite.
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The history of the quota system in the Icelandic cod fishery shows the limits and
potential political implications of a narrowly technical or ‘scientific’ approach to the
problem of management, even in a relatively democratic system. In the absence of a
holistic, contextual analysis of the fishing industry, a discriminatory but seemingly fair
and neutral policy was adopted. The fear of environmental disaster has not so much
resulted in successful attempts to redress the ecological balance; rather it has 
instituted a policy which radically alters the balance between social groups. This
example shows that it is necessary to incorporate sociological analysis into fisheries
research and decision making in order to ensure a sound and responsible fisheries
policy. Management must seek an understanding of the organisation of fishing 
systems and how the parts relate to one another. To translate this in practical terms,
one may ask for example: To what extent should management address individual
operators and to what extent the holistic nature of fleets, fisheries and fishing commu-
nities? To properly access such considerations, we need comparative knowledge of
the systemic properties of fisheries activities and their place in fishing communities.
Gísli PALSSON 
Lisbon, June 1989
(Titles and sub-titles by the editor).
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Kleine vissers dupe van Iaks overheidsbeleid
GROTE SCHEPEN RUKKEN OP IN
NEDERLAND
Een vrouw als voorzitter van een vissersbond, dat is nogal
ongewoon. Zeker als die vrouw niet uit een vissersfamilie
komt. Toch is Marjet Witkamp al vijf jaar tot ieders tevreden-
heid voorzitter van ‘Hulp in nood’, een vereniging van kleine
vissers rond de Waddenzee, een ondiepe zee in het noorden
van Nederland. Ze werd gekozen tot voorzitter omdat ze als lid
van de gemeenteraad van Ulrum, een gemeente met 3750
inwoners aan de kust van de Waddenzee, altijd opkomt voor de
belangen van de vissers. Momenteel behartigt ze de belangen
van de kleine vissers ook als bestuurslid van de landelijke
Vissersbond en als wethouder van Ulrum. Aan haar grote inzet
dankt zij haar erenaam ‘koningin van de Waddenzee’.
Een gesprek met Marjet Witkamp over de kleine visserij in
Nederland betekent vooral een gesprek over het Iakse beleid
van de Nederlandse regering. Op een onverantwoorde wijze
heeft de-ze regering toegelaten dat de vissersschepen groter
en groter werden.
”I n Nederland is de overcapaciteit van de vissersvloot het grootste pro-bleem”, vertelt Marjet Witkamp. “De Nederlandse regering heeft geen actiefvisserijbeleid willen voeren. Men heeft alles overgelaten aan het vrije spel van de
economische krachten.” Ongerust voegt ze eraan toe: “Ik ben bang dat op den
duur grote vissers zullen overleven en de kleintjes worden weggedrukt.”
De Nederlandse vissersvloot is de grootste en modemste van Europa. De
vloot bestaat momenteel uit ongeveer 600 schepen, grofweg onder te 
ver-delen in drie groepen: 50 zeer grote schepen met een motorvermogen van
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meer dan 2000 pk ; 350 middelgrote schepen tussen 800 en 1500 pk ; en 200
kleine schepen van minder dan 300 pk. In totaal telt de vloot 550.000 pk.
De problemen rond de overcapaciteit zijn terug te voeren op overbevissing
van de Noordzee. Biologen waarschuwen al tientallen jaren dat de Noord-zee
leeggevist dreigt te worden. In reactie daarop stelde de Westeuropese regering
in de jaren zeventig vangstbeperkingen in. Zo verbood de Neder-landse reging in
1977 de vangst van haring voor korte tijd totaal. Om de overbevissing effectiever
te kunnen aanpakken, sloten de landen van de Europese Gemeenschap (EG) in
1983 een gemeenschappelijk visserijakkoord. leder EG-land kreeg toen een
bepaald quotum voor vangst van verschillende vissoorten toegewezen.
Nederland kreeg vrij kleine quota. De Nederlandse quota waren voldoende voor
een vloot van 390.000 pk ; de Nederlandse vis-sersvloot was toen al beduidend
groter. Het gevolg was dat vloot moest inkrimpen.
Het tegendeel gebeurde echter: tussen 1983 en 1985 kwamen er 111
nieuwe schepen bij met in totaal 50.000 pk. Kapitaalkrachtige vissers bleven
voortdurend het vermogen van hun kotters vergroten. Dankzij investerings-subsi-
dies en belastingsvoordelen was dit voor hen erg aantrekkelijk. Kleine vissers
hadden die mogelijkheid nauwelijks.
Weinig controle
Marjet Witkamp steunt de vangstbeperkingen uit het Europese 
visserijakkoord, omdat anders de Noordzee over enige jaren leeggevist zou zijn
en de vissers hun inkomen zouden verliezen. Maar ze is kwaad dat de
Nederlandse regering geen hait heeft toegeroepen aan de ongeremde groei van
het motor-vermogen van de schepen.
Zo oefende de Nederlandse regering tot voor kort weinig controle uit op de
vangsthoeveelheden. Dit werkte in de hand dat de vissers de toegestane quota
massaal gingen overschrijden. Grote vissers konden daardoor de steeds grotere
capaciteit van hun schepen ten voile benutten, legt Marjet Witkamp uit.
Bovendien konden de grote vissers de boete die de overheid oplegde bij 
overschrijding van het quota gemakkelijk betalen: de waarde van de extra 
gevangen vis was tien maal zo groot als de boete.
De grote vissers vingen zelfs zoveel, dat in november 1985 het nationale
jaarquotum van schol al vol was. De regering verbood daarop de scholvangst
voor de rest yan het jaar, hoewel de vissers van de Nederlandse Vissersbond
(met schepen van maximaal 2000 pk) nog 1200 ton van het hun toebedeelde
quotum over hadden. Ze werden de dupe van de overtredingen van de grote 
vissers. Voor andere vissoorten gebeurde hetzelfde. Om nog een voorbeeld te
noemen: grote boomkorvissers die op platvis vissen, vingen in 1987 als bij-vangst
meer kabeljauw dan het nationale jaarquotum voor kabeljauw.
Marjet Witkamp vertelt, dat de Nederlandse Vissersbond jarenlang 
tever-geefs gepleit heeft voor het instellen van een wettelijk maximum aan het
motorvermogen. De hoogste van het gewenste maximum volgde de feitelijke
groei van het aantal pk’s: in 1971 pleitte de bond voor een maximum van 800
pk, in 1978 voor 1250 pk en in 1984 voor 2000 pk. De regering wilde lange tijd
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van geen pk-stop weten. Men was bang dat Nederland door een dergelijke stop
haar positie als vooraanstaand visserijland zou kwijtraken. Ook bena-drukte de
overheid dat grotere schepen economisch meer rendabel zijn (een grotere
vangst betekent immers een grotere financiële opbrengst). Pas toen in 1987 de
overschrijding van de vangstquota uit de hand liep ging de regering over tot een
wettelijke pk-stop. Uitbreiding boven 2000 pk is nu verboden. ”Bij tijdig ingrijpen
had er een stop kunnen zijn op bijvoorbeeld 1200 pk”, stelt Marjet Witkamp 
bitter vast. “Dan hadden we niet die enorme groei gehad en niet die enorme
overcapaciteit.”
De verhouding tussen de grote en kleine vissers is door deze ontwikkeling
erg slecht. “Ze kijken niet naar elkaar, groeten elkaar ook niet. De grote vissers
minachten de kleine. Ze redeneren: ‘Die veredelde roeiboten rekenen we niet
mee. ‘Ze varen met volle kracht en net interesseert ze niet of ergens een kleine
visser vaart.” De kleine vissers zijn op hun beurt erg kwaad dat de grote vissers
hun quota drastisch oversclirijden endaardoor hen het vissen af en toe onmogelijk
maakt.
Heel arm
Het gesprek voert naar de aparte positie van de kleine vissers van ‘Hulp in
nood’. Bij ‘Hulp in nood’ zijn 45 schepen aangesloten, met elk een schipper en
één of twee bemanningsleden. Het gaat om kotters met een motorvermogen van
nog geen 300 pk. De vissers varen dicht bij de noordkust van Nederland, op de
Noordzee en de Waddenzee, een kleine, zeer ondiepe randzee met een uniek
dieren en plantenleven. Hun thuishaven is de haven van Lauwersoog. De vissers
varen doorgaans twee maal per week uit en blijven dan twee dagen op zee. Een
dag per week besteden ze aan onderhoud van het schip en de netten.
‘Hulp in nood is de oudste vissersvereniging van Nederland. In 1884 werd
de vereniging opgericht ter ondersteuning van de weduwen en wezen van 
vissers die op zee verdronken. Tientallen jaren hield ‘Hulp in nood’ zich alleen met
dit soqrt hulp bezig. Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog ging de vereniging zich vooral
bezighouden met het behartigen van de belangen van de Wadden-zeevissers.
Marjet Wikamp vertelt, dat de vissers voor de Tweede Wereldoorlog heel
arm waren. “Er was geen watervoorziening en de huisjes waren erg klein. Soms
leefden drie gezinnen op een paar vierkante meter. Het hele gezin moest helpen
de gevangen garnalen te pellen, ook de kleine kinderen, soms tot s’avonds laat.
Er stond dan een bakje water op tafel om de ogen van de kinderen nat te maken,
zodat ze niet in slaap zouden vallen.” ‘s Winters kon er toen nauwelijks gevist
worden, vanwege ijsgang en storm. “Ze hadden toen schepen met zeil. Die
schepen waren heel weergevoelig.”
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd de situatie een stuk beter. Doordat 
vissen tijdens de oorlog vrijwel onmogelijk was, zat er na de oorlog veel vis in
de zee en waren de vangsten groot. Bovendien was er veel vraag naar vis.
“Vissers hebben toen een glorietijd meegemaakt. Niet dat ze rijk werden, maar
het ging veel beter. Ze kregen een eigen huis en betere schepen met goede




Sorting shrimps, Lauwersoog harbour (The Netherlands). (Photo by Conelie Quist)
motoren.” De omvang van de schepen groeide geleidelijk: van 40 pk voor de
oorlog, via 150 pk tien jaar geleden, tot maximaal 300 pk nu. Nog steeds
kunnen ze door slechte weersomstandigheden vaak niet uitvaren. De 
schepen zijn weliswaar minder weergevoelig dan vroeger, maar toch kan er
bij ijsgang in de Waddenzee of een windkracht van meer dan vijf niet gevist
worden. De vissers zijn al heel blij als ze per jaar 36 weken kunnen vissen.
Garnalen
De laatste jaren is het karakter van de visserij op de Waddenzee nogal
veranderd, constateert Marjet Witkamp met spijt. “Vroeger was er op de 
Waddenzee gemengde visserij. Zomers viste men op tong, in het najaar op 
kabel-jauw en de rest van het jaar op garnalen. De vissers haalden toen 1 à 2
procent van het nationale quotum voor kabeljauw uit het water. Maar de
Nederlandse regering had bij de verdeling van de quota onder de vissers weinig
aandacht voor de kleine vesserij. Doordat de vangst zo kleinschalig is, krijgen ze
sinds twee jaar geenvergunning meer om op kabeljauw te vissen.”
Bovendien raakten de Waddenzeevissers hun mini-quota voor de bij-vangst
grotendeels kwijt aan grote vissers. Quota werden namelijk, in tegen-spraak met
de voorschriften, handelswaar. Grote vissers hadden hun eigen quota al snel 
volgevist en hadden er veel geld voor over om hun quota uit te breiden. “Hadden
kleine vissers financiële problemen vanwege een aantal slechte jaren of extra
reparaties aan de boot, dan verkochten ze hun miniquota de voor bijvangst. Daar
werden grote bedragen voor geboden.”
Het gevolg is dat de Waddenzeevissers veel meer dan vroeger op garnalen
vissen, zeker nu sinds 1987 de controle op overschrijding van de vangstquota
verscherpt is. Het gemengde karakter van de visserij is verleden tijd. Marjet
Witkamp is bang dat er nu een overbevissing op garnalen onstaat. “De vangsten
zijn nu al minder groot dan vijfentwintig jaar geleden.” De vervuiling van de zee
speelt daarbij overigens ook een roi. Voor de garnalenvangst is tot nu toe geen
quotum ingesteld. Wel bestaat er een vergunningenstelsel, waar-door het aantal
garnalenvissers niet kan groeien.
Ecologische voordelen
Eén ding benadrukt Marjet Witkamp keer op keer: doordat de Nederlandse
regering de beperking van de vangstcapaciteit veel te laat serieus heeft aangepakt,
komen de kleine vissers nu in grote problemen. Marjet Witkamp: “Er moet nu een
harde sanering komen om als bedrijfstak te kunnen overleven en iedere visser een
normale boterham te bezorgen. Er moeten schepen afvallen. In de praktijk zullen
vooral de ‘midden vissers’, met kotters tussen 800 en 1500 pk, weggesaneerd 
worden. Maar ook in de kleine visserij is een sanering onontkoombaar.”
‘Hulp in nood’ vindt dat de Nederlandse regering moet voorkomen dat 
bedrijven simpelweg failliet gaan. Men moet meer geld uittrekken om het voor 
vissers aantrekkelijk te maken om hun bedrijf te beëindigen. “Met een grotere
saneringspremie wordt het voor oudere vissers aantrekkelijk om tien jaar eerder
op te houden met vissen.”
SAMUDRA DOSSIER No 2
51
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Marjet Witkamp zou het liefst zien dat de grote vissersschepen afvallen. “Ik
heb liever tien kleine in de vaart dan één grote.” Een reden is dat kleine schepen
beter zijn voor de werkgelegenheid : tien schepen van 300 pk leveren ongeveer
vijftig arbeidsplaatsen op; één schip van 3000 pk slechts ongeveer zeven. Ook in
sociaal opzicht heeft de kleine visserij voordelen. Marjet Witkamp: “Kleine vissers
zijn eerder tevreden met een redelijke boterham. Men hoeft geen miljoenen te
verdienen, men wil ook nog gezond leven en en een gezinsleven hebben. Grote
schepen blijven veel langer op zee, soms wel veertien dagen. Ze zijn bovendien
minder afhankelijk van het weer en varen dus vaak. Die vissers hebben daardoor
geen gezinsleven.”
Heel belangrijk zijn de ecologishe voordelen van de kleine visserij. Marjet
Witkamp: “De grote schepen hebben een grote trekkracht en zware netten.
Daardoor woelen ze de bovenste tien centimeter van de zeebodem om. Ze
maken kleine plantjes en visjes kapot en er onstaan kale vlakten onder water. De
trekkracht van de kleine schepen is lager en hun netten ploegen de bodem niet
om, ze slepen slechts over de grond. Een voordeel van kleine schepen is 
bovendien dat ze met slecht weer niet kunnen uitvaren; het gebied krijgt daardoor
tijd om zich te herstellen.”
Krachtig weerwoord
Verontwaardigd constateert Marjet Witkamp dat de Nederlandse regering
probeert de overcapaciteit af te wentelen op ontwikkelingslanden. ”De
Nederlandse regering is bezig alternatieven te zoeken in Afrika en Zuid-Amerika.
Ze wil de grote vissers daar laten vissen. Maar dat is geen structurale oplossing
voor de overcapaciteit. Bovendien zit je ook daar de kleine vissers dwars. Er is
een proef geweest om bij Marokko te vissen, maar dat is mislukt vanwege 
moeilijkheden met de plaatselijke bevolking. De vissers kwamen terug met 
verhalen over bedreigingen, berovingen en drugsmokkel. Er komt binnenkort een
nieuwe proef bij Algerije. De Nederlandse regering heeft daarover een contract
gesloten met de Algerijnse regering. Die krijgt daarvoor een aantrekkelijk bedrag
betaald. Dat is voor zo’n arm land natuurlijk zeer welkom, maar er wordt niet
gedacht aan de kleine vissers in Algerije.”
Voortdurend moet Marjet Witkamp bij de Nederlandse regering en binnen de
Nederlandse Vissersbond optornen tegen de invloed van de grote visserij.
Zonder een krachtig weerwoord zouden de belangen van de kleine vissers in
Nederland volledig.over het hoofd worden gezien. Soms lijkt het vechten tegen
de bierkaai. ”Wat kun je tegen de grote vissers doen,” vraagt ze zich wel eens
vertwijfeld af, ”er is niet tegen te vechten. Ze hebben meer kapitaal, meer
mogelijkheden om het beleid té beïvloeden.” Toch gaat ze vol energie door. ”We
vechten niet tégen de groten,” benadrukt ze, “maar vóór de kleinen. We moeten
zorgen dat de kleine visserij overeind blijft.”
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THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
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Should careful and rational management of fish stocks
be considered a myth or a realistic prospect?
Recent history has shown how. because of over-exploi-
tation of certain fish-stocks – among which herring. an-
chovy and cod are prime examples – the survival of some
species has become an acute problem. Today all fishing
zones are threatened, and no stock is safe from potential
collapse.
The situation is so serious that some scientists and fish-
workers’ organisations have acted to sound the alarm and
to demand from governments that measures to protect
the resource be implemented.
However, looking beyond the indispensable need for
legislation, it is the search for maximum profit which,
unfortunately, so often governs fish production and mar-
keting that must be challenged. Moreover, the question of
resource management must integrate the need  to safe-
guard the ecology of the marine environment, which
requires profound changes of mentality.
In Lisbon, Portugal, in June 1989, about one hundred
scientists, fishermen and organisation representatives
from 25 different countries met at a symposium to devel-
op their thinking on these questions. In this dossier, we
publish some papers by European speakers at this inter-
national meeting organised by ICSF
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